CHAPTER 2: RESOURCES, CONFLICT AND SOCIAL IDENTITY IN CONTEXT

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2.1. INTRODUCTION

Our relationship with physical things, other people and ideas (hence material, social and symbolic dimensions of our wellbeing) are profoundly affected by where we live and by the 'place' of different localities in history. Central Peru has been profoundly affected, for example, by changing terms of engagement with the national and world economy: altering the link between livelihood and land, increasing labour mobility and bringing new forms of cultural media. The main purpose of this chapter is to sketch the geographical setting and historical context of our research, allowing for further exploration into dimensions of regional difference as well as similarity. This entails describing salient physical and social aspects of each research site, and the wider region in which they are located. More ambitiously, it also begins to explore how sites are perceived and connected in the minds of their inhabitants. In so doing, we draw also on the concept of "imagined communities" to consider the idea of "place" in a historical, social, cultural and political as well as a geographical sense (Anderson, 2003).[1] Section 2.2 provides a brief introduction to Huancayo and the Mantaro Valley, with some references also to Huancavelica. Section 2.3 briefly describes in turn each of the seven research sites already briefly introduced in Chapter 1. This chapter draws on secondary literature, community profiles of each research site compiled by the field team, and discussions with a wide range of local actors, including other social scientists working in the region.

2.2. REGIONAL CONTEXT

2.2.1 The corridor concept

The idea of economic 'corridors' has been promoted by government and aid agencies as part of a strategy for development of strategic supply chains linking coast, mountain and jungle.[2] The concept was adopted by the WeD research team to facilitate selection of sites, as it reflects wide variation in altitude and access to natural resources, in population density and degree of urbanisation,, in relative importance of

[1] Although primarily interested in nationalism, Anderson argues that "all communities larger than primordial villages (and perhaps even these) are imagined." (p.6). Although he did not address explicitly the link between wellbeing and imagined political communities, the two are tacitly linked in the way he explains the rise of nationalism as a response to the cultural weakening of religion and dynastic hierarchies, and as a mechanism for enabling people to transcend their own temporal and spatial insignificance as mortal individuals.

[2] The regional government of Junin (2003:72) uses the term to refer to the main road network linking Huancayo to Satipo via La Oroya and Tarma. USAID also adopted the term for a $35 million commitment for the period 2002-2007 to a project entitled "increased economic opportunities for the poor in selected economic corridors of Peru." Huancayo and Huancavelica were included as separate corridors and a number of value-chains with potential to support the livelihoods of poor people were identified within them, including barley production in and around Alegria. Rather ironically (given its capacity to depress agricultural prices) much of the funding committed was in the form of food aid.

local and global trade, proximity to centres of political power and ethnicity and language. The concept also emphasises the importance of flows of money, goods and people along the central highway between Lima and the interior of Junin and Huancavelica. However, such flows cannot be neatly segmented into discrete channels, nor does the idea of a corridor exist within the popular imagination.[3],Nevertheless, some form of local and regional analyses of development are necessary to compliment national and international frameworks (Long and Roberts, 1984:3). Here we focus first on the Mantaro Valley, then briefly contrast this with a perspective from Huancavelica.

2.2.2 The Mantaro Valley in historical perspective

Although not much is known about habitation of the Mantaro Valley in the pre-Inca period, archaeological and linguistic evidence suggest it was the centre of a unified Huanca kingdom immediately prior to the Inca conquest in 1460.[4] More controversial is the argument, advanced by historian Waldemar Espinoza, that the Huanca were sufficiently united and strong to greet the Spanish in 1532 as liberators and potential allies. Jose Maria Arguedas built on this interpretation of the conquest by arguing that this alliance (a factor in persuading Pizarro to locate his first capital in the Mantaro Valley at Jauja, and then on the nearest part of the Pacific Coast at Lima) allowed the Huanca nobility and their subjects to escape the extremes of servitude and exploitation experienced by other Andean groups. Others have argued that this simplified version of a distinctive Huanca history can also be seen as a more recent process of reinvention of tradition and identity (Alvarez, 2005; Romero, 2004).

Studies of colonial history in the valley suggest that while the gradual establishment of a dominant *mestizo* landowning class was far from rapid or smooth, it advanced further and faster here than in the Southern highlands, which had a tradition of absolute rule by Spanish overlords (*gamonales*).[5] Key to the process were matrimonial alliances across racial and ethnic barriers, the establishment of nucleated farming towns on each side of the river (such as Descanso), the role of fraternal alliances (*cofradias*) of landowners and peasants within each town, and the slow decline of the *kurakas*, a distinct indigenous landowning aristocracy (Alvarez, 2005).

The role of *mestizo* landowners in the nationalist struggle for independence from Spain during the 1820s remains a matter of debate, but conflict is likely to have created more opportunities for its consolidation as a class, as well as hastening the gradual disappearance from the valley of *campesinos* of pure indigenous ancestry. Consequently, the 1879-83 war and Chilean occupation did not pitch white landowning collaborators against Indian peasant guerrillas as starkly as it did further south. Rather, relatively successful resistance in the valley further consolidated the emergence of a self-consciously patriotic *mestizo* social identity, in which hierarchy in control of land was conflated with communal and reciprocal traditions of work and festivity. In the 1920s, when anthropologists began to document the livelihoods and folklore of the valley, they could advance the idea of economically differentiated but

[3] An attempt by the national government of Alejandro Toledo to establish macro planning regions based not on the idea of corridors precisely, but on the idea of linking coastal, highland and jungle regions was roundly defeated by referendum in October 2005. In Junin, 75% of voters said no to being linked with Ancash, Huanuco, Pasco and the provinces of Lima. In Huncavelica, 84% of voters said no to being linked with Ayacucho and Ica (Escuela Para el Desarrollo, 2005).

[4] Previously it had been divided into three: Hatuna Xauxa, Lurin Huanca and Hanan Huanca, whereas in cultural terms there had been two distinct areas (Xauxa and Huanca) since the twelfth century.

[5] Such studies include Richard Adams in Muquiyauyo, Gavin Smith in Huasicancha, Gabriel Escobar in Sicaya and Florencia Mallon in Acolla.

culturally homogeneous communities: each with a distinctive identity linked to craft products, patron saints and festivities, weekly markets and control of communal land. From there it was a small step for Arguedas and others to develop the idea of an even wider imagined community of *mestizo* peasants and landowners less deeply stratified by racialised hierarchies than elsewhere in Peru (Alvarez, 2005; Manrique, 2003).

If there ever was a golden age of harmonious communities in the Mantaro valley then it didn't last long. The penetration of capitalist relations in agriculture was greatly accelerated by the arrival of the Cerro de Pasco company in the region and construction of the railway from Lima to Huancavelica at the beginning of the twentieth century. A substantial empirical literature explores its impact on the regional economy, including the effect of wage income from miners on agrarian structure (Long and Roberts, 1978; Mallon, 1983). In rural areas differential access to cash incomes stimulated the formation of a land market and the emergence of a class of commercial farmers selling food, wood, clothes and shoes to meet growing demand from the mines and cities. These relied to varying degrees on reciprocal and communal forms of labour mobilisation as much as wage labour. In some villages, relatively equal land distribution combined with rising education to facilitate communal activities and infrastructural development: the hydro-electric project in Muquiyauyo (built in 1908) being a celebrated example (Adams, 1959). But in many parts of the valley smaller peasant farms proved unable to raise productivity to match rising off-farm employment opportunities. As a result their contribution to agricultural output became increasingly marginal relative to their dependence on seasonal migration. Population growth, farm differentiation, and informal small-business opportunities arising from increased demand for non-food goods and services fuelled migration and urbanisation. Within the valley itself the city of Huancayo grew rapidly into the dominant regional trading, financial and supply centre, linking mining and agricultural sectors, and controlled more by mercantilist than by landowning interests (Long and Roberts, 1978:70-87).

Up to the 1960s it was still possible to view all of the above as part of a chaotic but progressive process of economic development, with the mining sector as the major engine of growth, pulling small-scale trading and agriculture along behind it. However, by the 1970s direct and indirect employment creation as a result of mining and related activities was faltering. Major business interests in Huancayo began to switch their centre of operation to Lima, weakening its already weak industrial base in favour of commerce and government services. The agrarian reform of 1969 did little in Junin to help small-scale farmers, being mostly restricted to a small number of upland pasture areas and jungle estates (Long and Roberts, 1978:248-253). The agricultural sector throughout the country performed badly during the 1970s, with highland producers in particular finding it ever harder to compete with producers on the coast and abroad (Crabtree, 2006).[6] Instead they became increasingly dependent upon seasonal migration and remittances, including those sent back from rapidly growing towns in the Selva like Canchamayo and Satipo. (CVR, 2003:136; INEI, 2005). But in urban areas the struggle for secure employment accentuated the importance of ethnicity and education (Figueroa, 2003).

2.2.3 Violence and poverty in the 1980s and 1990s.

[6] Sheahan (1999:48) reports an annual decline in value added in agriculture in the 1970s for Peru of -0.6%, compared to an average annual GDP growth rate of 3.7%. Its contribution to GDP fell from 16.6% to 10.7% and food output per person fell by more than 20%.

The 1980s began with elections and heightened political expectations, but neither the government of Belaunde in the first half of the decade, nor that of Alan Garcia in the second, proved able to handle them. In the context of the wider 'lost decade of growth for Latin America' the failure was in part economic: Peru's GDP recorded an average annual fall of 1.2 percent through the 1980s, led by falling earnings from the mining sector (Sheahan, 1999:48). But even more traumatic was the success of Shining Path in building a popular movement, fuelled by personal experience of poverty and exclusion, against the prevailing political and economic system (Starn *et al*, 1995; Sheahan, 1999:33).

The final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR, 2003) dedicates a chapter to the effects of the Maoist insurgency in the central highlands, which it defines as the Departments of Junin and Pasco, plus the Northernmost Provinces of Huancavelica. It starts by noting the region's strategic importance (as the shortest transport link from Lima to both the *sierra* and *selva* (mountain and jungle) and its reputation as the most prosperous highland region. It also emphasises its hybrid *mestizo* identity: a commercially-oriented economy and popular culture that combines growing consumerism with many traditional Andean characteristics, and had avoided the extremes of agrarian conflict experienced elsewhere in the country. (CVR, 2003:137). These features, as well as the rapid defeat of the MIR (*Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario*) insurgency in 1965 led many people to assume it would be resistant to the revolutionary doctrines and tactics of both Shining Path (*Partido Comunista del Peru - Sendero Luminoso)* and MRTA (*Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru*).

Events initially bore this out: during the early 1980s, acts of violence in Junin were less frequent than to the south. However, both terrorist groups greatly strengthened their presence in the region during this time: MRTA through the arrival of leaders from Cuzco in 1984, and Shining Path through the arrival of insurgents from Huancavelica, Ayacucho and Apurimac after the army entered these departments in 1982. Shining Path opened its first guerrilla zone in the Chaupihuaranga valley of Pasco, and built strong networks among students, particularly of *Universidad Nacional del Centro del Peru* (the National University of Central Peru), as well as in poorer settlements surrounding Huancayo city.[7] Although much smaller than Shining Path, MRTA infiltrated unions, student groups and peasant associations. It established a strong presence in the jungle areas of Chanchamayo and in the high forest areas (including Selva Manta) stretching from there up to the Mantaro valley. Destruction of infrastructure, hostage-taking, summary trials and assassination of police, municipal and communal leaders all increased rapidly through the 1980s, particularly after 1985. By 1987 Shining Path was present throughout the region; it controlled popular committees in many communities and its armed columns roamed freely.

According to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the maximum number of recorded deaths and disappearances in the region in one year was 785 in 1990, this being out of a total 3,618 recorded for the period 1980 to 2000 (CVR, 2003:145). This includes 903 in the Mantaro Valley (including Huancayo city), 782 in the two Northern provinces of Huancavelica, and 1,556 in the central jungle areas. Local NGOs estimated that by 1990 approximately 15,000 displaced people were living in

[7] UNCP was the centre of major infighting between MRTA, Shining Path and paramilitary during 1989. The police and army entered the main campus in June 1990, detaining more than 100 students, and in 1991 the army took control of the whole university. The military presence on campus came to an end only in July 1998.

the Mantaro Valley (compared with more than 300,000 nationally). But it became increasingly hard to distinguish between internally displaced persons and other migrants, particularly as the "IDP" label became a means for securing NGO and government support for relief and reconstruction (Stepputat and Sorensen, 2001:775).

The government of Alan Garcia declared a state of emergency over the whole region in 1989. The presence of the army gradually spread out from the main barracks in Huancayo, Jauja and La Merced into surrounding areas. Public confidence in the army was low, being fuelled by accounts of atrocities elsewhere, and this was initially reinforced by some indiscriminate punitive killings in communities in the Mantaro Valley (CVR, 2003:141). However, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded that the tactics of the army in the region were mostly more restrained than further south, as well as more effectively directed towards a strategy that comprised rebuilding confidence, accumulating intelligence, carrying out targeted actions and supporting mostly voluntary civilian self-defence committees through provision of training and firearms (CVR, 2003:143). This strategy resulted initially in an increase in deaths and disappearances, but gradually the tide turned. MRTA's strength waned first, after a series of setbacks in 1989, including the celebrated April 'Enfrentamiento de los Molinos' (Battle of the Mills), where 67 MRTA militants were killed by the Peruvian army leaving the area dominated by Shining Path. By 1992, however, (and the capture of Abimael Guzmán) Shining Path also faced military defeat in the region. Violence nevertheless continued sporadically throughout the 1990s, with Shining Path retaining a minor presence in some jungle areas beyond 2000.

Recovery from the national crisis at the end of the 1980s was gradual. The economic stabilization programme introduced by Fujimori in August 1990 tackled the hyperinflation he had inherited, but resulted in two more years of economic stagnation and rising poverty (Diaz, Saavedra and Torero, 2006). While a long period of economic growth and rising average incomes followed (interrupted briefly in the late 1990s) this was also associated with increasing inequality, mitigated only very partially by the expansion of public investment and social protection programmes.[8] Agriculture in the highlands was also adversely affected by competition with the coast and from food imports, contributing to a sharp fall in real agricultural prices. For example, the five year average real farm-gate prices for potatoes, wheat and coffee for 1996-2000 was respectively 34%, 29% and 36% of those a decade earlier, while the volume of food imports was 70% higher (Crabtree, 2006). Income was increasingly skewed in favour of farmers and traders with more land and better commercial connections, including Huancayo's infamous 'potato kings' - wholesalers-cum-moneylenders with entrenched control over marketing of crops from particular localities. Meanwhile, poorer households sought to diversify their activities, but were constrained in their capacity to improve farm productivity by continued out-migration (Escobal, 2001).

In urban areas unemployment has spurred increased investment in private as well as public education, but often with poor quality results. The availability of cheap imported goods has stimulated the retail sector, with fast-food chains and illegal imitation of branded consumer goods being other areas of growth. Some financial institutions (most notably the *Caja Municipal* of Huancayo) have flourished by attracting deposits built up from remittances and investment in micro-businesses, mostly in the service sector. But the tendency for more successful business people and

[8] These include financial and technical support for community infrastructure projects through FONCODES, provision of food to popular kitchens and for children's meals by PRONAA, and provision of milk powder and other food to 'glass of milk' committees via municipalities.

professionals to migrate to Lima and abroad means the city lacks a substantial upper or even middle class. This social fluidity combined with unemployment and consumerism goes some way to explaining the growth of youth delinquency and gang culture. The presence of so many relatives outside the region, and the growing share of imported goods in the market, has also changed the regional identity: to the extent that Huanca nationalism persists within its diaspora as much as in the minds of the valley's current inhabitants.[9]

2.2.4 A view from Huancavelica.[10]

The district of Alegria is economically oriented towards Huancayo both through trade in goods and movement of people, but at the same time it is linked to Huancavelica administratively and linguistically. Hence some understanding of Huancavelica province is also necessary in setting the context for the research. Table 2.2 reveals some of the differences between the two, as well as making a comparison with the department of Lima.

Table 2.2: Comparative statistics for Lima, Junin and Huancavelica departments.

Department	Year	Peru	Lima	Junin	H'velica
Population ('000)	2002	26,745	7,748	1,247	443
Population density ('000/sq.km)	2002	20	222	28	20
Population increase (% per year)	93-02	n.a.	2.0	1.5	1.1
Urban population (%)	1981	n.a.	1.0	60.0	25.0
Urban population (%)	2002	n.a.	1.0	67.0	29.0
Life expectancy (years)	2000	68.7	73.2	67.2	64.2
Adult illiteracy (%)	2000	10.7	3.9	11.9	27.5
Women's illiteracy (%)	2000	16.0	6.2	17.6	38.3
Av. adult education (years)	2000	8.1	10.0	7.6	4.6
Children speaking Quechua (%)	2000	n.a.	n.a.	8.0	59.8
Single mothers (%)	2000	17.7	21.3	18.2	15.3
GDP (million soles 1994 prices)	1995	107,039	50,155	4,420	940
GDP (million soles 1994 prices)	2001	121,513	57,462	4,498	777
GDP growth (%)	95-01	13.5	14.6	1.8	-17.3
GDP per person	2001	13,815	6,473	3,545	2,122
Share of agriculture (%)	1995	13.3	1.9	13.9	24.8
Share of agriculture (%)	2001	n.a.	1.8	14.8	25.7
Poverty incidence (%)	2004	51.6	37.1	52.6	84.4
Extreme poverty (%)	2004	19.2	4.2	18.3	59.9

Source: PNUD (2002); PEISA (2003); INIE (2005).

The table shows that Huancavelica has a smaller and more rural population. Rural to urban migration within the Department is relatively low, Huancavelica city having a population of only 30,000 owing to the prevalence of migration out of the Department

[9] Many emigrants retain their cultural affinity by returning to participate in *fiestas*, These originate in *Kuruka* assertion of power in colonial times, combined with Catholicism, the agricultural calendar and celebration of 'the cycle of life'.

[10] This section is largely based on field notes by Altimirano and Alvarez following a visit to Huancavelica in 2005, translated into English by Michelle McCrory.

altogether. GDP per person is also smaller and more reliant on agriculture, than in other Peruvian Departments. The Huancavelican regional economy contracted sharply in the second half of the 1990s, whereas it grew in Lima (along with much of the coast), and remained stagnant in Junin. Average formal education of those over 25 years of age is less and illiteracy higher, particularly for women. The incidence of poverty and extreme poverty is also much higher. Cultural differences are reflected in the much higher proportion of children aged 5-14 who speak Quechua, as well as a slightly lower incidence of single mothers. The province of Tayacaja (where Alegria is located) occupies an intermediate position between the averages for Junin and Huancavelica: demographically close to the latter, but economically influenced by its commercial orientation towards the city of Huancayo, and in the more densely populated north of Huancavelica rather than the larger but more sparsely populated and pastoral south. Key informants emphasised a strong work ethic in Tayacaja, but also greater extremes of wealth: with many richer farmers being able to own their own transport and educate their children privately in more Westernised schools in Huancayo city.

The city of Huancavelica lies 150km south of Huancayo with direct metalled road and rail links. It grew up originally to serve the nearby mine of Santa Barbara, which in the 16th century supplied the Spanish empire with much of the mercury it needed to extract and purify silver and gold. However, it is also the point of contact between the commercial economy and the more self-sufficient peasant farming communities to the east and south of the department. The city is also an entry point for growing numbers of government and non-government organisations, attracted there in part by Huancavelica's dubious status as the poorest department in the country, with a Human Development Index as low as 0.439.[11] Part of Huancavelica's low economic status can be attributed to the drain of educated people to Huancayo and Lima. Those without much formal education, in contrast, are filled with stories of being 'badly treated' in these places and maintain their cultural orientation in the opposite direction. Cultural polarisation is evident in the reluctance of people to use Quechua in the presence of strangers, and by separate queues for indigenous and white people outside banks and local stores. Among young and unemployed people there is a continued sense of oppression, with conflict between the communal peasant life and unfulfilled aspirations for secure paid employment

Why is Huancavelica such a poor region? For many residents, the answer is both simple and profound: because the most important resources in the region (human, animal, agricultural, mineral, hydro-electric) are exploited to serve the interests of outsiders.[12] The faded colonial style of the city itself testifies to this: aristocratic houses and lavish churches are reminders of the period of mining exploitation. During the colonial period indigenous people were employed as servants or even as "*pongaje*" (effectively slaves). However, resources were directed towards foreign markets, with mine owners reinvesting very little in the region. Instead they encouraged centralism and the plunder of regional resources: the railway line to Huancayo and highways to the coast were all built to reinforce these distribution channels. In the case of agriculture, merchants from Huancayo dominate the markets,,

[11] The manager of the President hotel, for example, remarked that "before our best clients were miners and business men, now its NGO workers and state civil servants".

[12] *Antunez de Mayolo* is one of the largest power plants in South America, located on the Mantaro river at Quichuas, Colcabamba. However, it does not generate any benefits for the region, apart from a disputed monthly levy of 8 million soles for the province of Colcabamaba. Water to irrigate valleys along the Ica coast is also taken from the high lagoons of the department.

extracting low prices from farmers (the word *huanca* is regionally used to mean "negotiator"). The trade in Alpaca and Vicuna wool is also controlled by outsiders.

To conclude, although Alegria lies only on the edge of Huancavelica and is oriented towards Huancayo it can be expected that many of its residents feel a stronger cultural and political ambivalence towards the modernisation and globalisation that the cities of Huancayo and Lima represent. This can be portrayed in stereotypes: of the more business-oriented and urban savvy Spanish-speaking *mestizo* in the Mantaro Valley and of the Quechua-speaking Indian *communero* in Huancavelica. But it is more accurate to imagine a many layered cultural landscape, providing people with opportunities to develop nuanced and indeed multiple "cultural styles" and performances, profoundly influenced but not wholly dictated by place of origin and race.[13]

2.6 Social identities by site

By social identity we refer to how people are perceived or labelled by others. Such labelling is of course highly political. The same label can also carry multiple, ambiguous and constantly changing meanings depending upon who is using it and in what context (Wright-Revolledo, 2007). This presents a methodological dilemma. On the one hand it is evident that social identities have an important bearing on wellbeing: directly, through how they affect how people feel about themselves, given they way they are perceived by others: and indirectly, though their influence on status, power and access to resources. On the other hand, use of such labels in field work is fraught difficulties, both ethical and of interpretation. A question in the RANQ survey, for example, that invited people to describe themselves yielded data that was very difficult to interpret: the most common response being that people stated where they came from in geographical terms. This section is based on closed questions included in the first round of the WeDQoL survey, comprising lists of social identities labels that the field team knew to be widely understood in the region, and the field worker offered no explanation of their meanings. Of course it is likely that some answers were influenced by the respondents perception of the social identity of the interviewer, but at least most of them had been interviewed by the same person at least once before and were familiar with their presence in the locality. Although limited in scope, the data does reveal significant differences between sites as well as insight into the underlying complexity of the issue.

In the Peruvian context we have already alluded to the way the colonial settlement established a racialised class hierarchy between *blanco* (white, of Spanish birth), *criollo* (white of Peruvian birth), *mestizo* (mixed race) and *indio* (indigenous) categories (Manrique, 1999; Quijano, 2000). We have also alluded briefly to attempts to challenge these labels, through attempts to revive highland (*serrano*) or Andean cultural identity ("*lo andino*"). A further important evolution in social identity that is associated strongly with migration is emergence of the label *cholo*; while its meaning remains fluid and much debated a first approximation to it is the idea of the peasant arriving in the city who gradually fuses indigenous and Serrano cultural identities with other influences (Manrique, 1999:6). The remaining labels used in the questionnaire are more explicitly racial in origin: *negro* (black), *charapa (*Amazonic Indian*)* and *chino (East Asian,* not just Chinese as evidenced by reference to Fujimori as *'El Chino'* despite his Japanese ancestry.

[13] For a discussion of the idea of cultural style see Ferguson, 1999.

The sample comprised 550 individuals. Of these 45 percent were men, 27% under 25 years of age, 63% aged 25-45 and 10% over 45 years. Gender and age was not significantly different between sites. In contrast there were significant differences between sites with respect to residential status and religion (see Table 2.3). In Llajta Iskay, Llajta Jock, Alegria and Descanso more than three-quarters of respondents had been resident there for more than 15 years, and a majority had been born there. In the two urban sites, in contrast, a majority were born in a "very different place" and had been resident for less than 15 years. Selva Manta represented an intermediate case; a higher proportion of respondents there were also Protestant.

Table 2.3 Demographic details of sample

		Llajta Iskay	Llajta Jock	Selva Manta	Alegria	Descanso	Progreso	Nuevo Lugar	Total
Residence in site									
1-5 years	N	7	3	3	8	6	26	18	71
	%	11.7	5.0	10.0	8.0	6.0	26.0	18.0	12.9
6-15	n	6	7	11	13	17	41	62	157
years	%	10.0	11.7	36.7	13.0	17.0	41.0	62.0	28.5
Total	n	60	60	30	100	100	100	100	550
Where born?									
Here	n	54	37	18	80	92	13	0	294
	%	90.0	61.7	60.0	80.0	94.8	13.0	0.0	53.7
In a very	n	1	3	1	10	0	71	65	151
different place	%	1.7	5.0	3.3	10.0	0.0	71.0	65.0	27.6
Total	n	60	60	30	100	97	100	100	547
Religion? (otherwise Protestant)									
Catholic	n	49	49	8	90	91	79	83	449
	%	83.1	81.7	28.6	95.7	95.8	80.6	84.7	84.4
Total	n	59	60	28	94	95	98	98	532

Turning to social identity, 329 of the 550 respondents were willing to describe themselves using one of nine terms offered to them: *mestizo, serrano, blanco, cholo, indio, negro, criollo, charapa* and *chino*. 52% of these respondents described themselves as *mestizo* (mixed race), 25.2% as *serrano* (highlander), 11.2% as *blanco* (white), and 3.6% as *cholo.* (See Table 2.4). This last category is often used pejoratively, but as a first approximation it can be defined as someone of *mestizo* or *indio* origin with a culture that combines aspects of *serrano* and *criollo (*coastal). Site differences were significant. The term *serrano* was used mostly by respondents in the urban and, to a lesser extent, the peri-urban sites. The term *blanco* was used more by people in rural sites, particularly those in Huancavelica.

Table 2.4 Self-categorization by site.

% of site responses	Llajta Iskay	Llajta Jock	Selva Manta	Alegria	Descanso	Progreso	Nuevo Lugar	Total
Mestizo	53.3	70.0	90.0	53.3	56.7	41.7	30.5	52.6
Serrano	13.3	3.3	0.0	23.3	30.0	36.7	40.7	25.2
Blanco	26.7	20.0	10.0	15.0	6.7	5.0	6.8	11.2

Cholo	3.3	0.0	0.0	1.7	3.3	10.0	3.4	3.6
Criollo	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	15.3	3.0
Indio	3.3	0.0	0.0	3.3	1.7	1.7	0.0	1.5
Charapa	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	1.7	1.7	3.4	1.5
Negro	0.0	6.7	0.0	1.7	0.0	1.7	0.0	1.2
Total (no.)	30	30	30	60	60	60	59	329

In 67.7% of cases the respondent used the same category that they applied to themselves to describe their community as well. The main divergences were that 7.3% of respondents called themselves *mestizo* but their community *serrano*, and 8.5% described themselves but not their community as *blanco* (see Table 2.5). The second of these divergences is explored further here, on the assumption that it might reveal more about how social identity differs between sites. Table 2.6 compares the use of the label *blanco* in response to six different questions, between-site differences in the frequency of responses being statistically significant in all cases.

Responses to question 1 reveal that quite contrary to what might be expected a higher proportion of respondents (one third) in Llajta Iskay categorized their community as *blanco* than in any other. More of them also categorized themselves in the same way.[14] In both cases the frequency of this response was next highest in the other rural Huancavelica site (Llajta Jock). This contrasts with the categorization of the interviewers who were half as likely to categorize respondents in any site as *blanco*.[15] Respondents in Llajta Iskay were most likely to say they regarded the majority of *blancos* as "good" or "very good". A higher proportion of respondents in Llajta Iskay and Llajta Jock also said that if it was possible to be born again, then they would wish to be *blanco*; whereas in all other sites the majority said they would wish to be either *serrano* or *mestizo*. Their view of the level of respect accorded to *blancos* in Peru was not markedly higher, this being lowest in the two peri-urban sites.

This warns against a simplistic assumption that the closer people are to Lima the more they identify themselves with being *blanco.* A more tentative interpretation is that in the rural sites of Huancavelica fewer people are content with the way they categorize themselves and are categorized by others.

Table 2.5 Self and community categorization of social identity compared

Community categorization		Self-categorization								Total
		Blanco	*Mestizo*	*Indio*	*Cholo*	*Negro*	*Criollo*	*Serrano*	*Charapa*	
Blanco	No	9	6	0	0	0	0	2	0	17
	%	2.7	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	5.2
Mestizo	No	17	137	1	1	2	2	10	2	172
	%	5.2	41.6	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.6	3.0	0.6	52.3
Indio	No	1	1	2	0	1	0	2	0	7
	%	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.6	0.0	2.1

[14] The last column indicates that more of the respondents in Llajta Iskay were also discontent or very discontent with the social category they gave themselves.

[15] Overall, the interviewers classified the respondents into three categories: 92.3% *mestizo*, 5% *blanco* and 2.8% *indio.* In addition to raising questions about the social identity and categorization of the interviewers themselves it also serves as a reminder that respondents' replies may also have been influenced by this.

Cholo	No	3	3	0	7	0	2	2	0	17
	%	0.9	0.9	0.0	2.1	0.0	0.6	0.6	0.0	5.2
Negro	No	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
	%	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
Criollo	No	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
	%	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.6
Serrano	No	6	24	2	4	1	5	67	3	112
	%	1.8	7.3	0.6	1.2	0.3	1.5	20.4	0.9	34.0
Total	No	37	173	5	12	4	10	83	5	329
	%	11.2	52.6	1.5	3.6	1.2	3.0	25.2	1.5	100.0

Table 2.6. Use of the term *blanco* (white) by site

% of site responses		Llajta Iskay	Llajta Jock	Selva Manta	Aleg-ria	Des-canso	Prog-reso	Nuevo Lugar	Total
1. Community	No	10	3	1	1	0	2	0	17
	%	33.3	10.0	3.3	1.7	0.0	3.3	0.0	5.2
2. Self	No	8	6	3	9	4	3	4	37
	%	26.7	20.0	10.0	15.0	6.7	5.0	6.8	11.2
3. Interviewer	No	3	0	2	7	3	1	0	16
	%	10.0	0.0	6.7	11.7	5.5	1.7	0.0	5.0
4. Good or very good?	No	28	19	24	52	47	34	49	253
	%	93.3	63.3	80.0	86.7	78.3	56.7	81.7	76.6
5. Personal ideal?	No	18	18	13	26	9	12	8	104
	%	60.0	60.0	43.3	43.3	15.0	20.0	13.3	31.5
6. Not content with category	No	5	2	2	9	4	2	2	26
	%	16.7	6.7	6.6	15.0	6.7	3.3	3.3	7.9
7. Respected? (yes)	No	28	25	29	44	52	58	57	293
	%	93.3	83.3	96.7	73.3	86.7	96.7	98.3	89.3

Note. The actual questions were as follows. 1. In this community the people are [..]? 2. You are [..]? 3. classification of research investigator [..]. 4. How do most people regard the following [..]? (very bad, bad, good, very good). 5. If you had the chance to be born again, what would you be like? 6. Are you content to be [response to question 2]? (very discontent, discontent, content, very content). 7. Are [..] respected in Peru?

2.4. COMMUNITY PROFILES

This section provides a brief narrative overview of each research site, including physical features, demography, culture, history, livelihoods, social organisation and external services based on information collected between 2003 and 2005. Statistics, unless otherwise stated, are for 2002.[16]

2.4.1. LLAJTA ISKAY

Llajta Iskay is located at an altitude of 3,500 metres overlooking the gorge cut by the Mantaro River after it crosses the boundary from Junin to Huancavelica. It is an annex of the Alegria district, whose headquarters is 25km away by unpaved road. Llajta Iskay has a population of 365, of whom 90% are Catholic and the remaining 10% evangelical. The latter are divided into two groups, who make regular use of adjacent chapels, while a priest only rarely visits the very dilapidated Catholic chapel. The

[16] For more detailed descriptions in Spanish see the WeD website http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/methods-toobox/cp-countries/cp-peru.htm

district mayor offered to help renovate the church, conditional to it being used by all denominations. The most important festivals are the Festival of the Cross in May and *Santiago* in July, when many migrants return to the village from Lima or Huancayo (see Table 2.3). Quechua is the first language in nearly all households, but three-quarters of the population are bilingual in both Quechua and Spanish: children and younger people put pressure on family members and teachers to speak Spanish so that they can learn it too.

Most land is held by an association of communal farmers comprising of 73 members, with land distributed among households and some plots retained for communal cultivation. The land controlled by the association has been reduced through conflict, including an unresolved dispute over grazing land with a neighbouring *hacienda.* In the last ten years the community tried to secure control of some parcels of land: the dispute has been taken to the Courts of Justice of Tayacaja and Huancavelica, but remains unresolved. Membership of the communal association is effectively compulsory for everyone over the age of 18, except the very old and even they complain of being forced to do communal work after they have retired. A small amount of privately titled land also exists and can be purchased and sold, but there is again a longstanding land conflict between two of the families. Agriculture is the main economic activity, followed by cattle raising, but none of the land is irrigated. The main agricultural products are potatoes, peas, barley and beans. These are sold internally or carried by lorry to Huancayo or Lima. All households keep domestic animals like cows, sheep, goats, donkeys, horses, rabbits, guinea pigs, pigs, chickens, dogs and cats. Wild animals in the area include pumas and foxes. Communal working practices are very important to the farming system, and include *ayni* (reciprocal help between two people), *minka* (everyone working together for one person at harvest time, during the sowing season or to build a house, for example) and *faena (*communal work for the benefit of the community, including cleaning ditches and improving roads).[17]

Leadership of the community is divided between the *teniente gobernador* (representative of the government), the justice of peace, the municipal agent and the president of the communal association.[18] There is much comparing of current with past incumbents and competition between posts, fuelled by longstanding personal rivalries. For example, a *faena* was organised to build an adobe lock-house in response to anger at young people returning to the village from outside and not being controlled by their families.[19] It remained unused for some time while argument raged about who should authorise its use. Meanwhile, another *faena* was organised to install new water pipes, provided with much celebration by the municipality but was of disputed quality. A much bigger dream is to secure electricity, but most people are sceptical that the community will ever manage to organise itself effectively enough to do so. There are no formal links with outside political parties, indeed, most people perceive themselves to be unaffected by outside politics and view elections with

[17] See Chapter 6 and Mayer (2002) for a fuller description and analysis of these institutions.
[18] The communal association also has an elected secretary, treasurer, v*ocales* (to notify people of meetings); and a *datarista* (registrar of births etc). Posts are generally elected by a show of hands and there is much rotation of individuals between them – anyone completing a turn at all receives a special certificate.
[19] Cattle rustlers and bandits (*abigeos*) have also been a problem. Some villagers were arrested by the police (who came from Pampas) and imprisoned for three years after they took the law into their own hands by killing one such thief. Some people in the community had suggested they tell the judges that everybody killed him, but they were unable to maintain a consistent story.

distain because they have to travel to Alegria to vote. Politicians only come to the community during municipal or presidential elections.

The Government supports a pre-school and primary school with four teachers and 113 pupils between them, but attendance is low. Many children do not complete primary school, leaving to work in agriculture instead. Many marry when as young as 14 years old, and almost all by the age of twenty, by seeking permission within the community and without *servinacuy* (living together first). While many dream of securing education outside their community for their children, they also complain about being unable to finance such an investment from farming income. Meanwhile the nursery and school buildings have been eroded by rain and are at risk of collapse. People's commitment to the school has also been undermined by disputes with one of the teachers who was suspected of stealing school materials.

Most houses have piped water, but there is neither electricity nor public sanitation. There is a health centre in the community, but it is rarely open due to the absence of staff and people tend to rely on traditional medicine. According to the visiting nurse, the most frequent health problems are acute malnutrition, pneumonia, bronchial infections, intestinal parasites and skin diseases. Additional problems affecting women include vaginal infections, inflamed ovaries and rheumatism. The death of a prominent member of the community (probably of AIDS) prompted widespread anger, fear, suspicion and accusations of evildoing that would affect others too. The community also has an administrative building; there is one public telephone and four small stores that sell groceries, including liquor and coca. Government provides food assistance through free school meals and there is one 'glass of milk' group.[20] The government agency *PRONAA* also provides products like tuna, rice, sugar, oil, yucca flour, corn and milk for children each month through the school. Cáritas, a Catholic NGO, supports barley production and conservation of land by constructing of terraces. The Ministry of Agriculture has promoted planting of eucalyptus and pine, and a *faena* was organised to establish the tree nursery, though not without some internal dispute as the site selected had traditional Andean spiritual significance to the community, related to ensuring a successful harvest.

Table 2.7. Seasonality in the Mantaro valley: highlights.

Month	Seasons	Crop farming	Main festivals
January	Wettest period. Limited work and money.	Land cultivation and weeding	New Year
February			Carnival
March			
April	End of the rainy season	Main harvest period for rain fed crops	Easter
May	Dry and sunny, but cold at night		Festival of the Cross
June			
July			*Santiago*
August			
September		Land preparation and sowing	
October	Start of the rainy season		
November			All Saints
December			Christmas

Note. Based on more detailed seasonal profiles for each site compiled by the field team.

[20] This is part of a national nutrition scheme that operated in all seven research sites, See Copestake (2006) for a detailed discussion of programme drawing upon data collected in each site is comparison of its operation in each.

2.4.2. LLAJTA JOCK

Llajta Jock is located 11 km along the dirt road to Llajta Iskay from the main Huancayo-Huancavelic highway just south of Alegria. Like Llajta Iskay, it is an annex of Alegria, with a similar mix of Catholic and Protestant, but the population is smaller (212). Most of the population speak Spanish and Quechua, while a few older people speak only Quechua and around 20% (all younger people) speaking only Spanish. Important festivals include *Santiago* and *Jalapato* in July, for which many migrants return home.[21] Other festivals have been abandoned as there are so few people living there. 44 houses are inhabited, all made of adobe with tiled roofing and mostly two storey. Llajta Jock is situated on land inherited by one of four children of the owner of a nearby *hacienda*. The settlement was formally recognised as a separate annex in 1976.

As in Llajta Iskay, the main economic activities are crop and livestock farming, and there is also an association of communal farmers. More land is in private ownership and many people work as labourers for larger farmers, earning S/.8-10 per day. Some lands are irrigated and as a result can generate two harvests each year. Previously the only crops were barley, wheat, beans, peas and native potatoes. But in the last five years, richer farmers with links in Huancayo have bought land in the community and begun to grow a wider range of potatoes, also introducing new types of fertiliser, insecticide and fungicide. There is no access to bank credit for the population, but loans can be obtained in emergencies from the association of communal farmers or from neighbouring families. The communal association possesses plantations of eucalyptus which are sold when required and the community also owns gypsum deposits. Cáritas technicians from Alegria offer some agricultural and nutritional advice. There are three small shops in the settlement, but Alegria is the main market for selling produce.

There is a pre-school with 28 children and a primary education centre with 53 students, but they have insufficient teaching resources such as text books and other materials. Adult illiteracy is 52% for women and 48% for men. As in Llajta Iskay, the community does not place great emphasis on education, preferring children to work on the farms and in the weekly market. But increasing numbers of children do continue their education, by attending the secondary school in Alegria. This is linked to a higher incidence of migration, destinations including Huancayo, Lima and the central jungle where people go to assist with coffee harvesting (especially between January and March). Many families receive groceries, clothes and money from relatives who have moved to Lima. There is a health centre in the community, staffed by two health technicians who work in coordination with the health centre in Alegria. 70% of the population use the health post, with the remainder relying on traditional medicine. Common ailments are similar to those in Llajta Iskay. The community has had an electricity supply since 2003. A bus service runs to and from Alegria on Mondays and Thursdays.

To become a member of the community, one must be 18 years old and register with the local authorities. People not from the community must reside there for one year and their access is dependent on good behaviour and adherence to customs. The community has a council, governor and municipal agent, elected at a community meeting, and an irrigation committee which organises water resources with two

[21] *Santiago* celebrates St James the Apostle but incorporates many pre-Colombian elements, particularly associated with care of animals. *Jalapata* involves the ritual honouring and slaughter of a duck whose last will and testament then becomes a vehicle for commenting on people and events in the village. It is celebrated in many other villages as well as in Huancayo and Lima.

neighbouring communities. 50% of women are married with 45% living with a man outside of marriage. There is only one woman who has a position in the council and one working for Cáritas. As in Llajta Iskay, the community does not engage much in wider politics. The main influence of government is the school and clinic. Ingredients for school meals are provided by PRONAA and there is a 'glass of milk' committee. Many traditional customs have declined, including respect for the authorities and participation in communal work (*faenas*). This is attributed to out-migration from the community and children's exposure to inappropriate behaviour through television.

The community has had a long running legal dispute with a private organisation over control of a lime quarry. Money has been raised to pay legal costs through *faenas* and by appealing to relatives in Lima. Residents dream that the quarry could provide them with better income than farming, and would encourage more people to live there. The community also fought and eventually won a ten year legal battle with a large landowning family over disputed land. The same family provoked much anger when their grain mill caused a break in the village electricity supply. This was eventually resolved with mediation by the school teacher, and the mill no longer operates.

2.4.3. SELVA MANTA

Selva Manta is located at an altitude of between 1,400 and 1,800 metres in cloud forest in the north-east of the department of Junin, in the province of Jauja. It is an annex, 12 km from the district centre, and more than 30 km from the nearest asphalt road and the town of San Ramon. The graded road into the valley was completed in 1970 at the initiative of a timber company from Lima, supported by the community and municipality. The population is 560, of whom 90% are evangelical Protestants, who have services three times a week in their own chapel. Most of the population originate from the Mantaro Valley and speak Spanish as their first language: only a few more recent migrants from Huancavelica and Huancayo know Quechua, but prefer not to use it.

The village was first established by Franciscan missionaries, the site previously having fallen within the territory of nomadic indigenous communities. Italian immigrants arrived at the beginning of the 20th century and colonized the zone, constructing six private *haciendas* and investing in sugarcane cultivation and livestock rearing. Their descendents have mostly moved to local towns or Lima, but continue to control much of the land. The main festival celebrated by people from Selva Manta, takes place in the district centre in July, marking the anniversary of settlement. It lasts three days, with *jalapato* and traditional dances such as *carnivales de Jauja* and is attended by people from other neighboring annexes and many out-migrants returning from Lima and Huancayo. Typical food is *pachamanca,* with ingredients like cassava, sweet potato, meat and the drink *warapo.* However, other festivals have stopped as a result of the influence of evangelical majority, who on occasions have interrupted the Catholic mass with shouting. Young people increasingly socialize separately, meeting people from neighboring annexes to drink *chicha* and other beverages.

Most people (men, women and children) work in the *haciendas* as agricultural laborers earning around S/.10 a day, often paid in-kind. Sugar cane remains the most important product. Production of coffee and *aguardiente (*sugar cane liquor) are also important economic activities. The climate is warmer than in Llajta Iskay and Llajta Jock, the alluvial soils are better and cultivation more intensive. Selva Manta does not have a communal association of farmers and most people do not own land. Products

are sold in San Ramon, Lima and Huancayo. Forest land is important for food, building materials, tools, firewood and medicine. Streams and rivers are abundant: water wheels power the sugar cane crushers, and fish are an additional source of protein. Selva Manta possesses a great biodiversity of flora and fauna and its residents are quick to bemoan its unrealized eco-tourist potential.

Selva Manta has its own primary school, and in comparison with Llajta Iskay and Llajta Jock parents are much more supportive of their children's education. But for secondary or higher education children must travel outside the district. Most leave school early to work in agriculture and it is common for women to have their first children by the age of 16. Temporary migration is also common for trade and social purposes: indeed many families effectively operate with rural and urban household bases, the latter most commonly in San Ramon. Employment in production of sugar cane and *aguardiente* attracts migrants from further into the Jauja province and beyond.

In contrast to the thriving primary school, the health post is not working and there is no access to electricity or piped water. PRONAA supports school meals and there is a 'glass of milk ' committee. But the most important organization in the settlement is the *ronda campesinas* (village militia) created at the behest of the Peruvian Army in 1990. During this period conflict between the army, MRTA and Shining Path resulted in a curfew from 18.00 hours and forced women and children to sleep hidden in the fields, while many moved away to nearby towns and to Lima. Although most people have returned, this era continues to cast a shadow of mistrust over the community, and men aged 17 to 40 years are still required to belong to the *ronda*. They are given weapons by the Peruvian army, who periodically visit for inspection and training.

2.4.4. ALEGRIA

The first references to Alegria are found during Inca times, as one of many resting places, approximately ten leagues apart, along the main Inca highway between Cusco and Quito. Alegria has been a district centre since 1912, and this is celebrated annually on 8 January. The new municipal offices on the plaza are a striking homage to modernism, complete with tinted plate glass windows and roof-top satellite dish. The district consists of hills dissected by valleys, ranging between 2,500 and 3,600m above sea level. Its total population in 2002 was 5,440, nearly three-quarters of them dispersed among 16 rural annexes (including Llajta Iskay and Llajta Jock), with an overall density of just under 35 per square kilometre. According to municipal figures, the total district population grew by the surprisingly high figure of 10% between 1999 and 2002.[22] However, they also show that the proportion of men living in the rural annexes actually fell by 2%, whereas their female population grew by 13%. In contrast, the population of men and women living in the municipal area rose rapidly: by 26% and 19% respectively. The result was a fall in those living in annexes from 72 to 69% of the total population, and a rise in women's share of the population (particularly in annexes) to nearly 54%, highlighting the extent to which migration is more common among men.

Having already described two of the district's annexes in some detail, this section presents data on the population living in the municipality itself which was taken as a separate research site. This is in turn divided into six quite widely dispersed neighbourhoods *(barrios)* interspersed with fields and straddling the main road

[22] Figure from the National Statistical Office suggest it then declined again to 5,072 in 2005.

between Huancayo and Huancavelica. Although they share a single town cemetery, each barrio has its own dominant families, municipal representatives, community organisations (including 'glass of milk' committees) and identity. Periodic conflicts rise up within and between them: for example, one barrio would prefer to split into two, while two others are in dispute over water rights from a common stream, and a third over water sharing with a neighbouring annex.

With most households heavily dependent on agriculture it is quite misleading in many ways to describe the town as urban – in fact it is peri-urban. Most households do have access to electricity and piped water, but only one *barrio* has mains sewerage and more than 90% are made of mud brick. The number of private houses (509) compared to the number of households (about 350) indicates much non-resident ownership of property. Many migrants in Lima and Huancayo originally found employment in businesses owned by families who migrated from the town earlier. A growing number of older people, both from inside and outside the district have chosen to settle in the centre of the town, renting a few rooms and often living off a small pension.

At district level 4,000 hectares of land (of a total area of 17,000 ha) are cultivable, and 8% of this can be cropped more than once in the year through seasonal irrigation from streams. Within the six *barrios* of the municipality itself 310 people belong to a single communal farmers association, and other farmers do not belong Membership is open only for those over 18 who have a partner and have been resident (and active in meetings) for at least two years. Most households own less than two hectares of rain fed land and one hectare of irrigated land, and sharecropping is common: with the tenant taking between half and three-quarters of the income depending upon the crops and on who pays for inputs. Cultivation mostly relies on oxen, and the main crops grown are barley, potatoes, wheat, peas, beans, and maize. Since 1998, particular effort has been made by the municipality, and Caritas, to improve production and marketing of barley, and an annual barley festival in the plaza attracts competitors from throughout the province and beyond. A grains collection and processing centre was completed in 2004, offering farmers a slight premium. However, farmers were wary of weakening often longstanding links with private traders, and the centre procured less than 30 tonnes. The Caritas technicians have also set up revolving seed funds with farmers' groups to encourage use of new seed varieties and techniques. But they admit progress had been slow, blaming this on both the farmers' risk-aversion and (more vaguely) cultural misunderstandings. Farmers themselves complained particularly about the time burden of attending Sunday morning *faenas* to help cultivate demonstration plots.

Other livelihoods include farm labourering (earning S/. 8-10 per day), trading (mostly women, who can earn up to S/.20 per day) and house-building, which can be much more lucrative. Although the town has neither a bank nor a post-office (and only one very erratic public telephone) there is a major market each Friday (established in 1938) which attracts cattle and sheep traders from the surrounding area and from Huancayo city. Non farm paid work is provided only by the municipality, a sawmill, a mechanic, a petrol station, a hotel with five rooms and three small bakeries. Many people are unemployed or underemployed. Migrants, including many secondary school leavers (from January to March) and others (from January to July) go to Lima, Huancayo and to the central jungle areas to find work harvesting coffee, before returning to Alegria for festivals in July and August.

Unpaved roads and tracks link Alegria with surrounding communities. The main road from Huancayo to Huancavelica was widened and upgraded in 2004. This

was the source of various conflicts. Workers came mainly from outside the town, some bringing their wives, but others renting local lodging and causing problems with residents that resulted in two of the three disco venues in the town being closed down. Some local people were employed by a sub-contractor (at a rate of S/.14 per day) but on several occasions it lacked funds to pay them at the end of the month, causing them to go on strike. Meanwhile owners of small shops and restaurants, and those able to rent out rooms enjoyed a temporary increase in income, while at the same time fearing that completion of the new road would result in fewer passers by stopping. In contrast the Mayor has ambitions to develop the town as a recreational and ecotourism centre. In addition to the *plaza* with its attractive view, there are fossil beds, the old Inca road and limestone caves to visit.

Those with houses adjacent to the road that had to be destroyed, due to the widening, received compensation, but conflict arose over the amount particularly in the case of a local lawyer. Other residents argued that he obtained and extended a house deliberately to get more compensation. He then refused to vacate it until *Provias* agreed to give him more money, thereby delaying settlement and completion of the works for the whole community. The president of the communal association also claimed he had not paid the proper amount for the house. Others accused him and his wife of being greedy and putting his own interests ahead of those of the town. The lawyer in turn made accusations in the provincial court of aggravated robbery, usurpation of property and physical aggression.

Most of the adult population of Alegria town is bilingual in Spanish and Quechua, though a growing proportion of young people understand Quechua but cannot speak it. Approximately 80% of the population is Catholic, although only about a quarter regularly attend mass: most barrios have small chapels but they are generally in disrepair and used mainly at annual festivals, of which the most important are *Santiago* (25 July), the Virgin of Asuncion (15 August), All Saints (1 November) and Christmas (25 December). There are also three protestant churches with small congregations.[23] Other community activities include football clubs, and three community FM radio stations that broadcast from 06.00 to 09.00 each day (one of which is run by the municipality). Unusually, there is a small openly gay group of at least five men in the town. Despite much disapproval from many people, one member of this group, a resident for only two years who runs a small restaurant - was appointed *major domo* of the town's anniversary celebration.

There are two nursery schools, three primary schools, one secondary school and an occupational education centre. Secondary school children from the annexes live in the town during weekdays while other children in the district go to Huancayo for their secondary education (total school enrolment in the district fell from 1,914 to 1,407 between 1993 and 2004). The road improvement makes it easier for teachers and health professionals to commute in to work from Huancayo city (one way fare S./8), although this also creates the possibility of skilled workers being able to live in Acostombo and commute daily to Huancayo for work.

The health services are insufficient in terms of infrastructure, equipment and a shortage of specialised staff. There is one health centre in the town with one doctor, two midwives, a nurse and three technicians. The main problems it deals with are respiratory problems, digestive problems, infectious diseases, urino-genital infections,

[23] Two of these have been embroiled in disputes. In one case the preacher was found to have two wives. In the other, the owner of the land on which the chapel was built died and his benefactor refused to accept their tenure. The leader of the congregation began to raise money to build a new one then ran away with it.

trauma/injury and nutritional deficiencies. According to the Education Ministry the malnutrition rate in children fell from 65% in 1999 to 55.8% in 2005, but these figures remain the subject of controversy.

2.4.5. DESCANSO

Descanso is located in the Mantaro Valley to the North of Huancayo at an altitude of 3,275m. It is 17 km from Huancayo and 3km from the "left hand" fork of the road from Lima. Intact pre-Inca stone grain stores and other archaeological evidence indicate that there has been a settlement there for more than 500 years. But the town only acquired district status in 1952. It also lies only a few kilometres from a neighbouring district town, and there is a strong rivalry between the two, sustained by unsettled land disputes, feuding between youth, and accusations of 'cross-border' house robberies. The 2002 census indicates the district had a population of 5,900 distributed between four urban *barrios* and three rural annexes, with about 10% of households having a dwelling in both the town and upland areas. 90% of the population is Catholic and 98% speaks only Spanish. The majority of the 1,037 houses in the town are built from adobe, but many also use brick and cement. 90% have access to electricity and drinking water, though lack of sewerage remains a more widespread issue. Drinking water is provided to the town by a water users' association with 762 members. It has been running for thirty years and is regarded as the most effective collective organisation in the district, with water quality checked quarterly by the Ministry of Health. The 2005 census estimate of 4,114 implies a dramatic 30% fall in population over just three years, indicating a continued high rate of net migration away from the district.

Agriculture is the main source of income for 80% of households, with another 10% relying mainly on livestock income. Casual work is provided by five small brick making businesses and commercial limestone quarrying. One of the annexes also has a small handicraft cooperative. Only 530 out of nearly 15,000 hectares of land in the district are cultivated, and less than ten percent of this is irrigated by canal from the Mantaro River. Much of the irrigated land is sharecropped: being owned by people who have migrated away. At the other extreme are undulating upland pastures stretching up into the Huaytapallana mountain range. The slopes are widely forested and support a wide variety of wildlife including medicinal plants. They are also used for grazing domestic animals, and for rainfed agriculture which causes localised erosion.

The communal association was registered in 1938. It currently has around 170 members and controls 9,000 hectares of upland. Small cultivable plots are distributed annually for cultivation by lot, and members also have grazing rights and share in revenue generated from forestry (mostly eucalyptus). The association has had a long-running dispute with the largest private landowning family in the town, which it accuses of acquiring land illegally at the time of the formation of the district. Several attempts to resolve the dispute legally (and as part of the agrarian reform) have failed, and it is said to have prompted accusations of terrorism during the 1980s. While facing criticism for not doing anything to resolve this issue, the president of the community association also played an active part in protests against environmental damage by the two companies extracting limestone in the district. For a long time the companies sought to 'compensate' the community with gifts of cement and irrigation pipes, but the community pressed for a comprehensive environmental assessment, followed by a legal settlement and payment of royalties. Meanwhile, production has been interrupted. In 2003, the president of the association also entered into an

agreement with a Spanish NGO to construct a school for 'Andean leadership'. But work was delayed by arguments among members over the terms on which the land was leased to the project. Rivals also accused the president of making unauthorised sales of timber and although not proven this resulted in him being suspended a year ahead of his scheduled term.

The town has a health centre, staffed by eight professionals all of whom commute by bus from outside the district. Common problems include chronic bronchitis, diabetes, diarrhoea, fevers and general infections. Approximately half of households use it as their first point of consultation, while the rest rely on a mixture of herbal medicines or buy their own drugs commercially. There is also an independent midwife in the town. She is reported to provide a warmer, home-based service, but has attended few births since the clinic stopped charging for anti-natal and obstetric services. Awareness and use of contraception is quite high, but adolescent pregnancy remains very common. Another foreign NGO supports various groups and campaigns in the town to uphold the rights of children and keep the town clean. But its main function is widely regarded as providing a secure salary for its local staff.

The district has three pre-schools, four primary schools and one secondary school, with a total of 1,208 students and ten teachers (although only one lives in the district). About 70 young people also commute to neighbouring towns and to Huancayo for further study. Adult illiteracy is much lower than in Alegria (9% among men and 16% among women according to the 1993 census), and there is active parent-teacher association. In 2003, the secondary school head (since 1995) stood unsuccessfully for election as district mayor. His supporters criticised the successful candidate (also a teacher) for having lived away from the district for most of his working life, returning with a party political affiliation and money to spend on the campaign in pursuit of his own political career. Conflict flared up later when the municipality unveiled a plaque on the school wall to commemorate improved concrete-block fencing and drainage. Angry parents removed it because there was no reference to their own contributions to the work, and the municipality reacted by calling the police to investigate what they regarded as an act of vandalism.

The most conspicuous acts of the municipality after taking office were to renovate its own offices and give the main square a makeover, which included removing most of the trees. This attracted further criticism and deepened a rift between those whose livelihoods were more rooted in the district (centred particularly on the communal association) and those with past or present working experience elsewhere. This was particularly evident at the main *Santiago* festival. While bigger than ever, this was dominated by visiting migrants, while local residents excluded themselves from the planning for fear of being asked to make contributions that were more than they could afford. In 2004, the municipality hired a facilitator to organise three meetings to promote wider participation in its own planning. Fifty attended the first, forty the second and twenty the third. Many complained that the room was too cold and that decisions had been taken already. A year later the meetings were better advertised and explained. A district advisory board was also established, comprising representatives of the community association, market committee, neighbourhood groups and NGOs. While many people were still critical of the mayor, they were more reconciled to him completing his term of office. Nevertheless, older residents complain that the district is less unified, highlighting the conflicts between schools, municipality and the communal association in particular.

2.4.6. EL PROGRESO

The *barrio* (neighbourhood) of El Progreso, is in one of the three districts making up Huancayo city. Divided into five sectors with a total population of 3,540, three of the sectors climb up barren and rocky foothills on the fringes of the city, It was from this poorer area, that primary data was collected. Each hillside sector has its own elected management committee, involved to varying degrees in trying to improve water supply, sanitation, electrification and land titling; but they are also arenas for internal conflict.

Inhabitants originate from Huancavelica and Ayacucho as well as from Junin, the majority being bilingual in Quechua and Spanish. No more than three-quarters are Catholic, and to attend mass they must walk to church in a neighbouring *barrio*. Important religious events include the Festival of the Cross on 24/25 May and the Virgin Carmen Festival on the 15/16 July. The remainder of the population belong to Pentecostal churches, of which there are four, one of which holds services in Quechua. Relations between Catholics and Protestants are bad. Churches are frequently vandalised, and house burglary (of small animals and electrical appliances) is often attributed to youth from the other faith group. Tensions also exist between Huancas and Huancavelicans, and in one sector these were conflated with a longstanding feud between two dominant families.[24]

After 1943 most of the land was allocated to a communal (peasant) association, which still owns an office, some forested parts of the hillside and a cemetery. However, most of its property was appropriated by members in 1966, particularly by the family of the then secretary, who in turn illegally 'sold' it to refugees from the violence of the 1980s and early 1990s. Inhabitants of two of the three hillside *barrios* have still not obtained formal land titles for their house plots. Doing so has been complicated by irregularities in the sale of the land in 1966 as well as subsequently.[25] In one sector further conflict arose when allegations of corruption were made against the president of the sector association. While the majority of residents regarded him as capable and honest, another committee member (who may himself have had ambitions to become president) accused the president of mispending funds, using the money collected to pay for lobbying on the land issue for his own meals and transport. Associates of this rival broke into the president's house in broad daylight, stole furniture, kitchen utensils and electrical appliances. The president is said to know who the culprits are and to have promised vengeance, but he did not report the robbery to the police.

Cement roads link the lower neighbourhoods of El Progreso to the rest of Huancayo, with several minibus companies competing for the routes. In contrast, the higher sectors can only be accessed on foot, along steep unmade paths between the houses. As few as a quarter of buildings are made of brick and cement, the remainder being adobe and only 68% of households have access to drinking water, mostly from wells dug 8 metres deep. The water is chlorinated and available without charge. In one sector, there is a water committee which, with the help of the FONCODES has

[24] This flared up when the youngest daughter of a leading family became unexpectedly pregnant. Her father had been president of the sector association three times, and her mother was president of the sector 'glass of milk' committee and of the children's canteen. The head of the family of the suspected father had recently taken over as president, prompting an attempt to split the sector into two. Fortified by alcohol members of his family visited the house of the first, but quickly became violent. The former president, his wife and one son were hospitalized. They took legal action, which is yet to be resolved.

[25] When interviewed he said "these people come from other places, they are foreign people wanting to invade my lands. I could not permit that and had to sell it, practically giving it away. But they are not grateful; they throw away their rubbish and spoil my crops, almost like they do it on purpose."

laid water pipes bringing water from tanks higher up the hill. However, this water is rationed and has to be paid for it is only sufficient for 80 people, despite there being 150 members of the management committee. With only 80% of houses having electricity supplies, those without have organised themselves into electrification committees to lobby for new connections.

There is no farmland in El Progreso itself, but some individuals cultivate vegetables within their house plots. Many also breed small animals such as guinea pigs and chickens, and a few have sheep, pigs and even cows. There are many informal livelihood activities in the neighbourhood: firewood distribution, de-shelling garlic and sewing festival costumes, are examples. Most men work in and around the major wholesale market of the city, which is within walking distance, and also serves as a centre for recruitment of casual labour. The main occupations are as street vendors (40%), market vendors (26%), construction workers (12%), agricultural labourers (10%) and cobblers (9%). There is also an association of rickshaw/cart (*vehiculos minores*) owners, which strictly controls the number of operators.

The barrio does not have its own school or college, and only one sector has a nursery school, with three staff and 80 children. Most children walk to schools in nearby areas, but there is a very high desertion rate, with children leaving to find casual work in the markets. Only 52% of all adults in the three upper *barrios* have completed primary school. Domestic violence and mistreatment of children are common, and the medical centre estimates that 70% of children under six are malnourished. There are many unmarried couples living together, and many young single mothers. Most married couples are older, or belong to one of the Evangelical churches. The most feared problems are crime, alcoholism, domestic violence and drug-addiction.

El Progreso is recognised by external agencies as an area of extreme poverty. The government health centre was relocated and expanded in 2005. It has a doctor, nurse, obstetrician, dentist and social worker. Popular canteens and ‘glass of milk’ committees operate in each sector where they are controlled by dominant families. There are several NGOs present, whose work includes protecting children’s rights, promoting village banking groups and providing food assistance for malnourished children. There is very limited access to credit, especially in the two sectors where people have no formal land title. No national or regional political parties have branches in the neighbourhood, and it is visited by politicians only during presidential, regional or district elections. The neighbourhood representative is elected for a period of two years and has organised the building of the medical post and communal work (*faenas*) to clean the streets and drains.

2.4.7. NUEVO LUGAR

Nuevo Lugar is located to approximately twenty km west of the centre of Lima, a few kilometres north of the main highway to Huancayo and the central highlands. The lower part of the settlement, closest to the highway is at an altitude of 550 meters, but houses stretch up the hillside to a height of more than 900 meters. The climate is warm, sunny and extremely dry, rainfall is minimal and the soils are largely barren. The area has been occupied since pre-Inca times, some Inca ruins remain, and after the Spanish conquest it was part of a large colonial estate. Most of the current population have moved there only in the last twenty five years: the recorded population for 2000 (100,025) was more than twice that recorded in 1993 (44,526). Plans for a large settlement took place in 1984 and it was formally recognised on12 July 1985. The project was led by the Municipality of Metropolitan Lima (controlled

at the time by the United Left party) in close collaboration with a network of Lima-based associations of migrants already resident in other parts of the city. The settlement was divided into 23 areas (each known by a letter of the alphabet), which were further divided into 239 neighbourhoods called UCV (*unidad communal de vivienda*). Each recognised housing plot was 90 metres square, and there were 60 lots per UCV. However, these guidelines have subsequently been undermined by continued unplanned arrivals of migrants both into and above existing neighbourhoods.

Zones are also informally classified into three by altitude: A to F being the lowest (and richest); G to I in the middle, and J to Z the highest (and poorest). In general more recent migrants are to be found in the higher zones, many of them arriving from the interior of the country (especially from Junín, Cerro de Pasco, Huancavelica, Apurimac and Ayacucho) during the worst periods of conflict in these areas. A census in 1985 indicated that just over half of household heads were born outside Lima and around 20% of the population was bilingual. Many inhabitants of the lower zones complain that the higher zones are chaotic havens of "gangs, thieves, drug addicts and prostitutes." Inhabitants of the higher zones are prone to refer to those living lower down as "selfish, evil and land dealers". Older residents also complain that the settlement has become less well organised over time.

Nuevo Lugar is legally a *centro poblado* (population centre) of the district of Atí-Vitarte, but it also has a self-governing council elected by residents.[26] This council has been campaigning for district status since 1987, but the municipality regards Nuevo Lugar as lacking a sufficiently diverse economy and skill base. When interviewed in 2005, the General Secretary of the self-governing body fiercely denied this: "there is nothing you can't get done here" he comments. He also criticised the municipality for prioritising improvement of the main *plaza*, rather than allocating sums to improve the hospital and facilities for the growing proportion of people who are elderly. Interviewed on the same day, the municipal agent described the settlement as immature and prone to *assistentialismo* (a dependency culture), and dismissed the self-governing council as debilitated by political infighting.

Behind these brief comments lies a complex history of conflict within the settlement, which is reviewed in some detail in an appendix of the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Problems arose in part from the electoral success of APRA in 1985 soon after the formation of Nuevo Lugar. Although it temporarily gained control of the self-governing council, the municipality quickly and drastically reduced technical and financial support for the new settlement. When the United Left took back control of the self-governing council it was politically weakened, and compromised by the need to negotiate deals with APRA in order to secure resources. Public mobilisation became harder at the same time as Shining Path cadres were seeking to consolidate their position in the settlement. Many local people bravely defied it (with strong support from within the Catholic Church), criticising it for being more interested in its own power than in development of the settlement. Nevertheless, Shining Path built up a strong presence: infiltrating secondary schools, playing a strong role in popular protests for more resources in 1988; using Nuevo Lugar as a base for blocking the central highway in 1989; and stage-managing the seizure of the potato harvest of a local landlord, during which one of his employees was shot. Shining Path also benefited from and accentuated (through intimidation and

[26] The sub-municipal office also covers a smaller neighbouring settlement. However, inhabitants of this settlement violently contested the planned settlement of Nuevo Lugar in 1985, laying weak foundations for subsequent collaboration between them.

murder) the organisational weakening and loss of legitimacy of both APRA and the United Left.

On coming to power in 1991, the Fujimori government established a military base in Nuevo Lugar, giving soldiers a relatively free hand to search, intimidate and arrest. It also quickly co-opted popular kitchens through use (and abuse) of its powers of patronage over food disbursement. As elsewhere, popular rejection of its message, and the resilience of local leaders and self-defence groups were instrumental in Shining Path's loss of influence, though it retained a presence in Nuevo Lugar long after the capture Abimael Guzman in 1992. A strong legacy also persisted of distrust, clientelism and eroded local political autonomy. For example, rivals for control of the self-governing assembly resorted to violence and assassination attempts in 2003, and meaningful decentralisation of municipal control appears to remain a distant goal.

Economically, at least, the settlement has partially recovered. Private bus and taxi services operate in all zones, although quality of roads and frequency of service declines in higher and more recently settled zones. The lower part of the settlement has electricity, water, drainage, telephone and internet connections. The higher parts are mostly electrified, and many now have at least some access to drinking water if not sanitation.[27] Government also provides night police and street cleaning. Private firms provide electricity, telephone, cable TV, education, health clinics, credit, security and transport. All the main political parties have branches in the settlement, and many NGOs are active in the settlement. However, 70% of the working population leaves Nuevo Lugar daily or weekly for the centre of Lima, where they work as domestic servants, in factories or in petty retailing. Within the settlement, most employment is in retailing and services. Nearly a quarter of all households have a female head of household. There is virtually no commercial agriculture, and only a little formally regulated manufacturing (shoe-making, carpentry and mechanical goods in an industrial park set up in 1986). Sand, clay, rocks and limestone are extracted on a small-scale for cement making and coastal defences, but the work is dangerous and poorly paid.

Education is available through 33 state schools and 34 private schools, with 90% enrolment of school-aged children, and 5% illiteracy among adults, only 60% of whom completed primary schooling. The state higher education institute offers three courses: car maintenance, computing and electrical trades. In 2005 government also operated two public hospitals and six other health centres, while there were more than thirty health facilities provided by the private sector, as well as numerous private pharmacies. The main health problems found in Nuevo Lugar are respiratory diseases, diarrhoea, dehydration, nutritional deficiency, circulation problems, cancer, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. As many as a quarter of households run short of food in each month, and depend for survival on communal kitchens and food distribution programmes. 253 'glass of milk' committees provide food to 75,000 children, and there are 250 communal kitchens. As in El Progreso, many young couples live together without legally marrying; domestic violence is a major problem, and there are a large number of young single mothers, particularly in the high zones.

2.5 SOME INITIAL CONCLUSIONS

The main purpose of this chapter has been to provide a 'thick' description of the setting of the research on which this book is based, rather than to develop a specific

[27] Water to half the population (all in the lower zones) is supplied through a treatment plant from the river Rímac, whereas higher areas rely on water delivered by truck by the municipality and private water sellers.

argument. Inevitably this description will also reflect the partial (though far from uniform) perspectives of the field team and of contributors drafting the final text. However, some points can usefully be made at this stage about the tension between local variation and uniformity in experience of wellbeing within the research area.

Not surprisingly, the community profiles highlight the diversity of the seven research sites and hence the difficulty of generalising about them, let alone about the three Departments in which they are located. For example we have noted major locational differences in access to physical resources, prevailing livelihoods, urbanisation, commercialization, population size, political designation, dominant cultural-linguistic orientation and recent history. In an attempt to capture such diversity the original site selection was influenced by the 'corridor' hypothesis: that these variables could to some extent be mapped onto a single underlying variable with a strong spatial component. The evidence presented here warns against this. Three examples, illustrate why. First, despite being physically located within walking distance of a major urban market place most people in El Progreso are politically more marginalised than most of the inhabitants of the two rural district centres. Second, the inhabitants of Selva Manta are physically and politically more remote than those in Alegria district, but labour allocation and livelihoods are more strongly commercialized. Third, although physically close to each other and sharing a similar livelihood pattern Llajta Jock and Llajta Iskay have many striking differences. Although access from outside to Llajta Jock is easier, more of its inhabitants were born elsewhere and community cohesion appears to be stronger.

While rejecting the corridor hypothesis, the chapter has also revealed important commonalities between the different sites. First, the struggle to build and sustain livelihoods combining self-employment with paid employment takes place within interconnected (if heavily segmented) labour and product markets. Temporary movement as well as longer-term migration are critical to these connections and vary according to geographical location. These patterns are explored further in Chapter 5. Second, there are strong similarities (notwithstanding important variations) in the informal institutions regulating social behaviour (festivities, collective action, clientelism) as well as in the provision of services by government and NGOs. These are explored further in Chapter 6. Third, while a polar distinction between Western and Andean orientation is dangerously simplistic, there are marked differences in the balance of social identities among people living in each site.

These three sets of variables (livelihood, institutional mix and social identity) cannot be mapped onto each other in a simple linear way. They are also likely to influence wellbeing in their own separate and distinct ways: livelihood being more concerned with the material; institutional mix with the relational; and social identity with the symbolic. Nevertheless it is also worth exploring further the complex links that do exist between them. At the beginning of the research we posited (in line with Figueroa's sigma model) a likely hierarchy: material entitlements dominating welfare, embedded within socio-political relations, and in turn protected by cultural/symbolic norms (Altamirano et al. 2004). Without rejecting this entirely, there is clearly scope for more complex theorisation about the relationship between each of them and wellbeing.

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