



**ESRC Research Group on
Wellbeing in Developing Countries**

WeD Working Paper 21

**MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE: THE CASE OF
PERU'S 'GLASS OF MILK' PROGRAMME**

Copyright © James Copestake

September 2006



WeD - Wellbeing in Developing Countries ESRC Research Group

WeD is a multidisciplinary research group funded by the ESRC, dedicated to the study of poverty, inequality and the quality of life in poor countries. The research group is based at the University of Bath and draws on the knowledge and expertise from three different departments (Economics and International Development, Social and Policy Sciences and Psychology) as well as an extensive network of overseas contacts and specific partnerships with institutes in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Peru and Thailand. The purpose of the research programme is to develop conceptual and methodological tools for investigating and understanding the social and cultural construction of well-being in specific countries.

Correspondence

The Secretary

Wellbeing in Developing Countries ESRC Research Group (WeD)

3 East 2.10

University of Bath

Bath BA2 7AY, UK

E-mail wed@bath.ac.uk

Tel +44 (0) 1225 384514

www.welldev.org.uk

Fax +44 (0) 1225 384848

A large print size version of this paper is available on request.

Working Paper Submission

For enquiries concerning the submission of working papers please contact Ian Gough by email: i.r.gough@bath.ac.uk or by writing to the above address.

Acknowledgements

The support of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) is gratefully acknowledged. The work was part of the programme of the ESRC Research Group on Wellbeing in Developing Countries.

MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE: THE CASE OF PERU'S 'GLASS OF MILK' PROGRAMME

SUMMARY

Social assistance has attracted renewed interest in countries where economic growth is doing too little on its own to address high levels of income inequality and poverty. Research into the material effects of such programmes is important but can be misleading if it fails to capture their full meaning to intended beneficiaries and other stakeholders. This is illustrated by a case study of Peru's 'Glass of Milk' programme, drawing on mostly qualitative evidence of its material, social and cultural dimensions. The programme is found to be well adapted to diverse contexts, but in a way that enhances its efficacy as a gendered instrument of mass patronage rather than as a means of addressing Peru's structural inequalities. The paper concludes that a switch to conditional cash transfers is unlikely, on its own, to change this.

Key words: social assistance, poverty, wellbeing, clientelism, Peru, policy evaluation

Key Readings: Copestake, J. (2006) Poverty and exclusion, resources and relationships: theorising the links between economic and social development, in: I.Gough and J.A.McGregor (eds), *Wellbeing and development: from theory to research*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Farrington, J., and Slater, R. (2006) Cash transfers: panacea for poverty reduction or money down the drain? *Development Policy Review*, 24(5):499-511.

Molyneux, M. (2006) Mothers at the service of the new poverty agenda: Progresas /Oportunidades, Mexico's conditional transfer programme. *Social Policy and Administration*, 40(4):425-449.

Stifel, D. and Alderman, H. (2005) Targeting at the margin: the 'glass of milk' subsidy programme in Peru. *Journal of Development Studies*, 41(5):839-64.

Valdivia, M. (2005) Peru: is identifying the poor the main problem in targeting nutrition programmes? HNP Discussion paper, reaching the poor program paper no.7, World Bank.

1. INTRODUCTION

Social assistance programmes have attracted renewed interest among policy makers, particularly in countries such as Peru where economic growth is widely perceived to be doing too little on its own to address high income inequality and persistent poverty.¹ This paper argues that analysing these programmes solely with respect to material wellbeing, while important, can be misleading because it fails to capture their full meaning to intended beneficiaries and to other stakeholders. Any social assistance programme is embedded within a web of social relationships that is moulded in turn by strongly held beliefs and values. These influence how it is perceived by different stakeholders, how it operates in practice, scope for its reform and ultimately its effect on material wellbeing as well. This section reviews contemporary policy debates about social protection from a wellbeing perspective. The paper then takes the ‘glass of milk’ or ‘*vaso de leche*’ (VL) programme in Peru as a case study, and reports on mainly qualitative research into its material, social and cultural dimensions. The final section assesses the relevance of findings to debate over reform of VL in particular its strengths and weaknesses relative to more fashionable conditional cash transfer programmes.

The concept of wellbeing is used in this paper because it is sufficiently open and ambiguous to permit fresh analysis of policy debates from a range of social science perspectives. It encourages reflection about what it means to be a happy and fulfilled human being, what the basis for such ideas might be and the extent to which they are shared. This can encompass a multidimensional view of the nature of poverty and serve as an antidote to crude othering of ‘the’ poor by public policy professionals (Chambers, 1981; 1993; 2006). The concept is also broad enough to accommodate the arguments for moving beyond overly universal “one-size-fits-all” prescriptions for development by paying more heed to local cultural diversity (Gough, 2004; Rao and Walton, 2004; Gough and McGregor, 2006). To demonstrate how, this paper distinguishes between material, social and cultural outcomes of social assistance on wellbeing; that is to say outcomes arising from interaction with things (having), other people (belonging) and ideas (meaningfulness). This distinction is drawn from previous work on social exclusion in Peru that emphasises the way economic behaviour in

¹ Social assistance programmes can be defined as non-contributory transfers to those eligible on the basis of poverty or vulnerability. They are one of three strands of social protection, the other two being social insurance and the establishment of minimum standards of employment (Farrington and Slater, 2006:500)

pursuit of material resources (including accumulation of assets that reduce vulnerability) is moulded by membership of hierarchical social networks whose membership is defended by racial and cultural barriers (Moser, 1998; Figueroa et al., 2001; Figueroa, 2003; Altamirano et al., 2004; Copestake, 2006).

Contemporary debates about social assistance reflect at least three distinct visions of development.² An *income first* view is utilitarian, emphasises the goal of raising average incomes and the potential costs of social assistance programmes, including: recurrent claims on the national budget, moral hazard effects on recipients' incentive to work (as well as family and community incentives to look after each other) and the risk of creating incentives for rent-seeking behaviour and corruption. It favours minimalist and tightly controlled safety nets, or at least reform in that direction through more efficient targeting, competitive outsourcing, decentralization, and a shift from in-kind to cash transfers (Raczynski, 1998; Britto, 2005; Easterley, 2006; Farrington and Slater, 2006).

A *needs first* view reflects a more multi-dimensional understanding of human wellbeing and takes a more positive view of the capacity of the state to guarantee access to basic needs. Since transient and chronic poverty are closely interconnected it emphasises so, it is argued, should be policy responses to them (Barrientos and Hulme, 2006). Social assistance has the capacity not only to provide a protective safety net but also to act as a springboard for livelihood enhancement, asset accumulation, reduced vulnerability and capacity for public action (Bebbington, 1999; Moser, 1998; Rakodi, 1999; Bustamante, 2003:64; Devereux, 2006). Social protection, broadly defined, is seen as not just politically expedient but also as a moral responsibility; and an *income first* approach is rejected as a narrow, mean-spirited and probably short-sighted response on the part of the state and richer groups in society.

A *rights first* view emphasises injustice as a root cause of poverty, and the importance of poor and excluded citizens' own struggle against it. Social protection is regarded as a human right associated with citizenship. This

² The first encompasses the original Washington Consensus (WC), while the second and third represent competing post-WC visions: the first more rationalist, materialist, aid-oriented, top-down and paternalist; the second more focused on grass-roots action, power and citizenship. This echoes the distinction made by Gough and Wood (2004:321) between the role of "far sighted elites" and "popular social movements."

view is sceptical of the *needs first* view for the paternalism implicit in its emphasis on the benevolence of richer people (Hickey and Bracking, 2005; Schneider and Zuniga-Hamlin, 2005; DFID, 2005; Deneulin et al., 2006).

These views diverge in part because of the implicit weights attached to different dimensions of wellbeing, including the material (income, satisfaction of basic needs); relational (autonomy, inclusion) and symbolic (rights, self-reliance). For example, community participation in disbursement can accommodate diverse local contexts and needs, but at a possible cost in material targeting efficiency (Conning and Kevane, 2002; Platteau and Gaspart, 2003). In contrast, more anonymous, rule-based disbursement (or declientelisation) is consistent with a *rights first* agenda but can weaken valued social networks as well as political support for a programme (Auyero, 2000; Gough and Wood, 2004:321; Schneider and Zuniga-Hamlin, 2005). Section 4 presents qualitative data to illustrate these dilemmas, while Section 5 presents data on overall wellbeing outcomes.

2. THE GLASS OF MILK PROGRAMME.

The *vaso de leche* (VL) programme is the largest social assistance programme operating in Peru (Portocarrero, 2000; Parodi, 2000). It had an annual budget in 2000 of just under US\$100 million, reaching more than three million people (Valdivia, 2005:3). This money is distributed from the Ministry of Economy and Finance to Peru's 1,608 district-level municipal governments in accordance with precise legal guidelines (Bustamante, 2003:65). Each municipality is required to set up an administrative committee comprising relevant officials and representatives of the glass of milk committees (*comités de vaso de leche*, or CVLs) through which food is distributed. The administrative committee oversees procurement of milk and other food inputs and monitors distribution. The primary target group comprises expectant mothers and children under the age of seven.³ Children up to twelve, the elderly and tuberculosis sufferers form a secondary target group.

The VL programme can be traced back to informal responses of the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima to demands of the burgeoning popular canteen (*comedores populares*) movement in the 1970s (Bustamante, 2003:15; Blondet and Trivelli, 2004). In December 1984, around 25

³ This was lowered from 14 in 2004. One rationale for this is provided by Valdivia (2004) whose simulations found that poverty targeting is significantly improved by shifting to the lower age range.

thousand women joined a march in Lima to demand that all children should have the legal right to a glass of milk each day. The following month the Belaunde government responded with Law 24059, laying the foundations for a national glass of milk programme through Peru's two hundred or so provincial municipalities. The programme evolved through a series of subsequent laws, the most recent (Law 27470, enacted in 2001) delegating programme implementation to district municipalities (Bustamente, 2003:16).

This brief history illustrates dual aspects of the VL programme: a technical response to poverty, but also a political response to popular demands.⁴ This also explains why its implementation involves grassroots organisations in the form of CVLs. Membership of these (conferring eligibility for food and voting rights) are open to all women who are pregnant or who have eligible children and live in a designated area. An election must be held every two years to select members to be on its management board (*junta directiva*): government guidelines specify the need for president, treasurer, secretary and various other office bearers, and provide detailed guidelines on how CVLs should be run. Officials interviewed all emphasised how closely regulated the programme was and described their main policy goals as being to ensure better food quality and targeting of rations. However, they also acknowledged how little influence they had in practice over how CVLs operated.

There is a substantial quantitative literature on material dimensions of VL, including Laderchi (2001), Stifel and Alderman (2003; 2005) and Valdivia (2005). Using household survey data, Laderchi found that 39% of households receive some form of food aid, amounting to 12% of their pre-transfer income, with VL being the most widely available. Despite large leakages these transfers were progressive in their effect on income distribution, associated with higher household food expenditure and increased labour market participation of women. However, she found no significant association with child nutrition, as measured by weight/height. Valdivia estimated transfers to non-poor beneficiaries to be 33% in urban

⁴ Valdivia (2005:19) emphasises this in discussing reform options. A key to improved targeting efficiency is a stronger protocol for withdrawing CVL in areas where poverty incidence is low, but “leaks to non-poor may sustain the political support of the people who pay for these programmes.”

Laderchi (2001:9) also observes that targeting efficiency is weakened by “very flexible guidelines” and “ancillary objectives” such as women’s empowerment and community development, which she suggests may be important in sustaining support for the programme.

and 30% in rural areas, with corresponding coverage of the poor of 88% and 79%. Stifel and Alderman (2005) found that 50% of poor households and only 20% of non-poor households received VL benefits, with over 60% of the budget going to the former, but they were also unable to trace this through into improved child nutrition. They attribute successful targeting of poor *individuals* more to government allocation between districts than decentralized allocation within them, but the opposite is the case when efficiency is measured in *value* terms: over two-thirds of this attributable to intra-district allocations. They also use their data to estimate that roughly half of marginal increases in budget went to existing recipients and half to new recipients (including members of new CVLs) with poverty targeting efficiency being at least as high at the extensive as at the intensive margin.

Wider social aspects of VL have also attracted the attention of research, alongside that of other programmes targeted specifically at women (Clark and Laurie, 2000; Blondet and Trivelli, 2004; Hays Mitchell, 2002; Rousseau, 2006). These have emphasised its political role: partially as a stepping stone for women's participation in politics, but more importantly as an instrument of patronage and neo-populism. Given its pre-eminent influence over national politics most studies have focused particularly on the operation of VL and similar programmes in the Lima Metropolitan area.

3. METHODOLOGY

In contrast to the quantitative literature on material effects and targeting efficiency this paper presents mostly qualitative evidence on a wider range of programme processes and outcomes. Primary data was obtained through a combination of direct observation, key informant interviews and a small questionnaire-based survey. It was collected in seven sites along a rough East-West transect of Central Peru, purposively selected to reflect as much diversity as possible with respect to altitude, ecology, accessibility, settlement size and language use (see Table 1). They were also expected to reveal variation (emphasised by Abraham and Platteau, 2004) between more personalised and more anonymous social relations, according to settlement size and cultural heterogeneity. This is in turn consistent with variation in dominant leadership forms described by Tanaka (2001) between: "broking", in larger and culturally more heterogeneous sites; "clientelism" in intermediate sites, and "community" in smaller and culturally more homogenous sites.

Six local graduates in anthropology were employed to live in these villages between July 2004 and June 2005 as part of a wider programme of WeD

research in Peru (Gough and McGregor, 2006). One of their tasks during this period was to compile an inventory of all organisations and forms of collective action in each site. The VL programme was selected for further research, because its presence in all seven sites made it possible to investigate variation in how a standard national programme operates in such different contexts. In April, the author conducted 16 key informant interviews in four of the sites, and then drew up a checklist of open-ended questions for more in-depth qualitative research into one CVL per site. Where they had a choice, the field investigators selected the CVL with which they had best informal links. They were then given two months to answer the questions using a mixture of open-ended interviews with CVL members, direct observation (while carrying out other tasks under the WeD research) and informal discussions with non-members. Answers were written up in time for a debriefing workshop in July.

Table 1. A brief description of the selected research sites

Name, altitude and distance by road from Lima	Region, type, and population	Brief description
A. Llajta Iskay 3,400m 380km	Huancavelica (Rural – highlands) 365	Annex of D with poor road access. Mostly Quechua speaking. High rate of migration to Huancayo, Lima, mines and jungle: few immigrants.
B. Llajta Jock 3,300m 365km	Huancavelica (Rural – highlands) 212	Annex of D (on the route to A). A smaller and more close-knit community than A. Mostly Quechua speaking. High rate of migration to Huancayo, Lima, mines and jungle: few immigrants.
C. Selva Manta 1,400-1,800m 290km	Jauja Province of Junin (Rural – cloud forest) 560	Hamlet in a steep valley on the Eastern slopes of the Andes, dominated by commercial sugarcane cultivation. Spanish speaking. Comprises migrants from Huancavelica and other parts of Junin. Migration out during the violence (total), for education and business. Seasonal immigration.
D. Alegria 3,000-3,500m 355km	Huancavelica (Peri-urban – highlands) 5,440	Farming town and district centre south of Huancayo in Tayacaja Province along a recently improved road. Mostly bilingual. Some immigration from more villages. Migration out to Lima, Huancayo, central jungle and mines.
E. Descanso 3,275m 290km	Junin (Peri-urban – highlands) 5,323	Farming town and district centre in the Mantaro Valley. Almost entirely Spanish speaking, with easy access to Huancayo city. Some immigration, mostly for marriage. Migration out to Lima, central mines and jungle, especially for education.
F. Progreso 3,275-3,325m 310km	Junin (Urban–highlands) 1,560	Two neighbourhoods on barren hillside overlooking the city of Huancayo. Bilingual. Residents mostly arrived in the 1980s as a result of political violence, mostly from Huancavelica but also from Ayacucho and some highland villages of Junin.
G. Nuevo Lugar 550-900m 35km	Lima (Urban–coast) 150,000	Large settlement (part of the district of Atí vitarte) in hills to the east of Lima, founded in 1984. Mostly residents arrived in early 1990s from the Central Andes. Many are bilingual, but very few non-Spanish speaking.

Source : Community profiles, compiled by field investigators

To supplement this qualitative data, closed questions about the programme were also included in interviews with 236 women in the last round of an income and expenditure survey that also formed part of the WeD research. Of these women, 40% belonged to a CVL, 40% said they were not eligible, and 20% said they were eligible but preferred not to participate. The incidence of absolute extreme poverty among sample households (based on annual net income estimates) was 74%. This was lowest in Selva Manta (50%) and Nuevo Lugar (53%), and highest in the three Huancavelica sites (>90%), with Progreso (72%) and Descanso (77%) lying in between.⁵ As with other studies, participation in the programme was found to be progressive: of the 61 respondents *not* in the extreme poor category only 23% belonged to a CVL, while 36% said they were not eligible and 41% said they were eligible but preferred not to participate.

4. VARIATION IN THE OPERATION OF VL: QUALITATIVE FINDINGS

This section presents qualitative evidence on the extent to which decentralization of the programme to municipalities and CVLs has resulted in variation in its operation, particularly in the way resources are allocated, and in its influence on wider social relations and activities. Table 2 reveals clear differences in the age and size of selected CVLs (all of which had operated continuously since being formed) as well as in the frequency, quality and quantity of food disbursements. Variation in rations mostly reflects procurement decisions made at municipal level. For example, the Alegria municipality had recently switched to procuring from a processing plant in the district itself, established under a USAID project to improve the quality and profitability of cereal production in the area.

The CVL presidents were all aware of the existence of official rules governing food procurement, and some had participated in municipal level

⁵ The overall survey comprised three rounds of interviews (mostly with household head and spouse) in 254 households, and lasted from May 2005 to January 2006. The methodology for assessing poverty mirrored that used in official surveys, with the extreme poverty line based on money needed in each region to buy food for a month with a daily calorific value of 2,200 calories per person. Estimates were in all cases higher than official district statistics. As methodology was similar, this is likely to reflect pro-poor bias in site selection, as well as greater reluctance of richer households to participate in the survey.

meetings to discussions what products to buy and from whom.⁶ In contrast, few other members showed any interest in where the food came from, a typical remark being “all we know is that the food is received by the mayor who gives it to us because we have children.” However, they had strong views about the range and quality of food received, many complaining that they no longer received sugar, rice and flour. Respondents in Alegria were also critical of the locally sourced grain: preferring the taste of commercially supplied oats, and more suspicious than impressed by the municipality’s initiative in supporting local production.

⁶ Leadership of CVLs is limited in time by the requirement to have children of eligible age. Elections were reported to be open, albeit relying on a show of hands rather and rarely overseen by anyone from the municipality. The more common problem was a lack of women with sufficient education and trust willing to stand. The main disincentives to doing so were time and exposure to criticism. For example: in Nuevo Lugar, the leader was criticised for having raised the quota (to cover expenses) too much; in Alegria it was for being insufficiently proactive in seeking out new members. And in all rural sites there was much suspicion that leaders kept extra food back for themselves.

Table 2. Information about selected CVLs

Research site (total number of CVLs)	First year	Members (rations) in May	How often distributed?	Monthly milk ration	Per day (g)	Monthly porridge ration	Per day (g)
Llajta Iskay (one for the annex)	1997	32 (69)	Every two or three months	2 x 410g tins (powder)	27	250g of quínoa	8
Llajta Jock (one for the annex)	1990	19 (26)	Monthly or bimonthly	1 x 410g tins (powder)	14	3 x 225g bag of quínoa	22
Selva Manta (one for the annex)	1991	50 (103)	Monthly	1 x 410g tin (powder)	14	1kg bag of flour	33
Alegria (six in the town (24 in annexes)	1989	32 (54)	Should be monthly, often bimonthly	2 x 410g tins (powder)	27	6 x 225g bags of quínoa	45
Descanso (five in town, five in annexes)	1985	113 (146)	Monthly	3 x 410g tins (powder)	41	1 x 700g bag of quínoa	23
Progreso (six in the ward)	1996	30 (40)	Monthly	4 x 410g tins (powder)	55	None	0
Nuevo Lugar (253 in the sub- district)	1989	31 (64)	Received weekly, distributed daily	1.25x410g sachets (evaporated)	18	One 500g bag of oats	17

Source: Reports of field investigators based on a standard checklist of questions.

The most widespread system for food distribution, once procured, was for the municipal registrar to use district radio and other means to call representatives of CVLs to a meeting at which the food was disbursed in accordance with lists of members supplied by each. Most CVLs organised a quota to raise funds to cover the costs incurred by the president (and sometimes others) to attend this meeting and to bring back the food. On returning to their locality most CVL presidents alerted members to come to their house to collect their ration, on receipt of which they had to sign or make a thumbprint on a list that was then returned to the municipality. In the three rural sites, distribution was in practice often carried out only every two or even three months. This resulted in confusion (“sometimes we receive one tin, sometimes two – I don’t know why”) and also deterioration in food quality. Table 2 also indicates that the CVLs in the two annexes also received a lower ration than the CVL in the district centre.

In Nuevo Lugar the food was distributed weekly by zone secretaries (each responsible for ten CVLs) and prepared for distribution each morning by two members according to an agreed rota, using a stove belonging to the committee. An extra quota was paid to cover the cost of kerosene, cinnamon, cloves and apple to flavour the milk and porridge. Empty milk sachets were returned to the zone secretary to verify that they had not been sold on. The main rationale for preparing food in this way is to ensure food is actually eaten by the young children and pregnant women for whom it is intended. However, food was still often not consumed where it is prepared, but taken back to the home, and there was daily argument over how many cups each family should get. At all other sites food was distributed without being prepared, and usually shared by the whole household.

Efforts were being made by officials in all sites to limit eligibility for rations to pregnant and lactating women and children under seven in accordance with changed national guidelines. However, this was only rarely enforced through visits to CVLs to verify names and ages. Relationships within the CVL in Llajta Jock were highly personalised, both through *parentesco* (kinship) and *compadrazgo* (god parenthood). But it was community solidarity that dominated allocation: everyone should get a share, and if that required inventing pregnancies or altering birthdays so be it. Even the village school teacher received a ration, despite living outside the village. The only internal disagreement about this was with the village nurse (also an outsider) who argued that food should only go to those most in need. The situation in Llajta Iskay was similar, although here (and in Selva Manta)

some evangelical households with eligible children opted out on the grounds that it was demeaning to accept hand-outs from outsiders.

The CVL leaders in Selva Manta strongly resisted the cut in rations that would have resulted from the new eligibility rules by appealing to the district mayor, his own family's estate being located there. He agreed to continue with the same allocation so long as members actively participated in all district activities. And when they failed to attend the district anniversary celebrations he took no action, despite being heavily criticised for his show of favouritism. In Progreso potential demand for rations exceeded a *de facto* quota of 40 fixed by the municipality, and as new spaces became available the president decided who could join. The CVL was closely interlinked with a nearby "infant kitchen" with an overlapping membership which included many young single mothers. The president, who was active in both, responded that she made the selection on the basis of greatest need.

In Alegria and Descanso, CVL membership was strongly aligned by kinship and *compadrazgo*, but run more strictly: no alteration of ages, for example. Members of the CVL in Nuevo Lugar were in contrast not elated at all, and eligibility was strictly on the basis of official rules. But in the two urban sites there was more evidence of self-exclusion. One stallholder in Progreso observed "only those dying of hunger go there" Others saw it as taking too much time and hassle relative to the amount of food available or criticised it for being "assistentialism".

The flow of food sustaining CVLs did not come without strings. The most important of these was participation in civic events, including of the district anniversary celebrations, such as described in detail by Stepputat (2004). In Nuevo Lugar, there is also a special procession on 14 July to celebrate the anniversary of the VL movement itself. In Progreso, CVL presidents were informed that failure to send a dance group to the inauguration of a newly improved street (at which they would be required to carry placards praising the mayor) could result in a reduced number of rations. In Alegria, women were summoned into town to dance at the inauguration of the new road by President Toledo, and much angered when he performed the ceremony a few kilometres along the road instead. The Llajta Jock CVL was encouraged to attend district celebrations by the "best typical dish" competition, and one first prize of a cooking pot. But this provoked conflict because the president held on to it, saying they won mostly through her efforts; whereas others said it should be shared. There was also much criticism of the village

teacher and nurse for not participating in these activities, even though they both received rations.

The role of CVLs in mobilising women for other purposes is mixed. All the committees periodically sent a team to local *fulbito* (five-a-side football) and volleyball championships. Some municipalities also organised a weekly league; in Nuevo Lugar the prize for the winning team was 50kg of rice and sugar. The field researchers commented on the importance of these events as a break from daily chores, as well as a chance for young mothers to represent their community and to build personal relationships outside it. However, they also observed that participation was restricted to a minority. For example, in Selva Manta only ten of the 50 members played for the team, and they could only go to matches accompanied by their husbands.

Attempts to involve CVLs in income earning activities were also generally limited. The committee in Nuevo Lugar had raised money for neighbourhood fiestas and barbeques. An NGO in Progreso offered members food-for-work to help clean up the streets, but this was regarded as an affront. The Alegria municipality invited all VL recipients to training in improved guinea pig rearing, with free guinea pigs available as an incentive. But this entailed travelling to the district HQ as well as preparing a dedicated space to keep the animals. Only 32 out of nearly a thousand members in the district attended, nearly all from them from the district town itself, with none attending from Llajta Jock or Llajta Iskay.

Additional training opportunities were available to CVL leaders, sometimes timed to coincide with monthly meetings of the district administration committee. Some of the leaders found these useful, particularly the chance to interact with municipality staff and leaders from elsewhere.⁷ But for others meetings were a time-consuming chore and attendance was motivated at least in part by fear that rations to their committee would be cut if they were absent. Many members similarly regarded meetings of the CVL as a necessary chore. However, a minority had a more positive attitude, welcoming the chance to chat informally and breastfeed in a relaxed setting. In Llajta Iskay, women were initially permitted to attend only with their husbands, but after a few years were allowed to attend alone. In Progreso, an ex-president played an important role as a source of advice to younger members, sharing her experience of how to respond to problems of male

⁷ See Tanaka (2001:57-61) and Blondet and Trivelli (2004:15) for discussion of the role of VL in Lima as an arena civic education and local politics.

domestic violence, for example. However, the CVL was only one forum for informal networking, sharing and solidarity among women, particularly in smaller communities.

In the rural and peri-urban sites, leaders of the CVL commanded some status because they were seen as representative of all young women. For example, the field worker in Llajta Iskay commented that “it is influential because nearly every household belongs.” Similarly, the president of the communal association in Descanso observed “they must be consulted with respect to anything happening in the town: not just as recipients of the food but as people with important ideas and opinions.” In urban areas in contrast, where membership is more selective CVL leaders have a more restricted role as intermediaries with the municipality.

To sum up, there are significant qualitative differences in the way VL operated at the local level. In the annexes of Alegria, at one extreme, it was more strongly embedded in wider social relationships that weakened the influence of official guidelines. In Nuevo Lugar, at the other, the programme was more tightly controlled. However, the differences should not be overstated: VL remained recognisably the same programme in these different contexts, the incentives to membership and indeed to CVL leadership being very similar.⁸

5. RECIPIENTS’ VIEWS OF VL: QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE

When asked what they most liked about the programme a large majority of those interviewed individually (81/95) said getting the food.⁹ Most (49/95) indicated this to be worth S/.11-20 per month to them, with 22 saying less, and 24 more. By comparison, the mean estimated monthly net income per person over the year for the surveyed households was S/.96 (US\$.30) and the official extreme poverty line was S/.114-122, depending on local prices.

⁸ To be more specific, the distinction between community, clientelistic and broking forms of leadership drawn by Tanaka (1981), and discussed on page 8, is more pertinent at a higher political level. CVL leaders in rural annexes had more community status, while in Nuevo Lugar they could play more of a broking role by becoming zone representatives. But variation in these roles and opportunity for petty clientelism should not overshadow the reluctant voluntarism of CVL leaders at all levels.

⁹ Other responses were: attending social events (9), attending meetings (3), learning how to knit (1) and “everything” (1). In contrast, responses to being asked what they *least* liked were: meetings (36), poor quality of food (23), municipal social events (13), internal conflicts (7), delays in delivery of products (1) and nothing (10).

In view of these figures it is slightly surprising that only 27/95 respondents stated that the programme had improved the nutrition of their children, although only 20/95 actually denied this. The high incidence of ambivalent responses (48/95) probably also reflects many respondents' desire to emphasise that the food was simply not enough to address their underlying food insecurity problem.¹⁰

The first five columns of Table 3 present statistics on the same women's responses to a wider range of closed opinion questions, ranked according to how positive the responses were overall (as measured by the mean score shown in column 6). There was most positive agreement that the programme didn't make them feel inferior, was good for the community, was something they had a right to as Peruvians and had helped them to make friends. Opinion was also on balance positive that it had helped to strengthen their relationship within the community, was something they were happy to be part of, and felt proud about. In contrast, the balance of opinion was against the view that the programme strengthened relations within the family, made it easier to look after the family, helped them to live better, didn't take up time and caused no conflict. This variation in overall responses suggests quite an ambiguous view of the programme: significant but not vital, causing some conflict but nevertheless strengthening relations outside the family and of some symbolic significance.

Looking beyond averages, the table indicates polarisation of responses to some of the questions, about demands on time, for example: the respondents in Descanso and Neuvo Lugar being strongly of the view that it was time consuming, whereas those in Alegria, Llajta Jock and Quintojo mostly denied this. The last row indicates that the respondents in Alegria itself were generally most positive about the programme, whereas those in its two annexes of Alegria were most negative, followed by those in Nuevo Lugar.

¹⁰ These figures can be found in the 8th row of Table 3. An additional qualitative indication of the material importance of the food was the frequency and force of women's complaints about cuts in the quantity or quality of the rations. This rose to indignation to being asked – even hypothetically - how they would feel if the food was withdrawn. The field team also observed that some of the women who feigned indifference to receiving food were still prepared to change the ages of their children so as to remain eligible.

Table 3. Results of an opinion survey of VL respondents

"The glass of milk programme.." <i>Sample size = 95</i>	Yes (+1)	more or less (0)	No (-1)	Not sure , no repl y	Mean scores** (yes=1, more or less=0, no=-1)						
					All	Llajta Iskay	Llajta Jock	Alegria	Des- canso	Prog- reso	Nuevo Lugar
..makes me feel <i>no</i> more inferior than others.#	77	12	4	2	0.78	0.50*	1.00*	0.74	0.79	0.91	0.71
..is good for the community.	73	16	5	1	0.72	0.25*	0.50*	0.95*	0.79	0.87*	0.47*
..is something I have a right to as a Peruvian.	67	22	4	2	0.67	0.75	0.17*	0.95*	1.00*	0.50*	0.35*
..has helped me to make friends.	51	39	5	0	0.47	0.75*	0.00*	0.68*	0.32	0.70*	0.17*
..has strengthened relationships with others in my community	29	50	13	3	0.17	-0.71*	0.33	0.68*	-0.05*	0.23	0.06
..is something that I am happy to be part of.	26	53	12	4	0.15	-0.40*	0.00	0.74*	0.21	-0.22*	0.11
..makes me feel proud of my country.	38	31	26	0	0.14	-0.25*	-0.17*	0.32	0.53*	0.00	0.00
..has improved the nutrition of our children.	27	41	20	7	0.08	0.00	-0.60*	-0.50*	0.79*	0.10	0.13
..has strengthened relationships with my family.	18	52	20	5	-0.01	-0.29*	-0.33*	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.06
..makes it easier for me to look after my family.	20	50	23	2	-0.03	0.00	-0.33*	-0.53*	0.21*	0.18*	0.06
..has helped me to live better.	24	43	26	1	-0.03	-0.25*	-0.67*	-0.22	0.05	0.05	0.28*
..takes up <i>not</i> a lot of time.#	39	13	43	0	-0.06	0.63*	0.33*	0.68*	-0.79*	0.13	-0.78*
..causes <i>no</i> conflict in the community.#	26	26	42	1	-0.22	-0.88*	0.50*	0.32*	-1.00*	0.04*	-0.24
Mean response to all of the above questions	-	-	-	-	0.22	0.03*	0.07*	0.38*	0.22	0.27	0.12*
Observations	-	-	-	-	95	8	7	19	19	23	19

Source: WeD Peru, Income and Expenditure Survey. Notes: The polarities of these questions have been reversed by inserting the word in italics to facilitate comparison with other questions. *indicates whether the site mean is significantly different from overall sample mean at 99% level of confidence (based on two tailed Z-test). ** Selva Manta is omitted due to lack of responses.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM

The evidence presented above confirms most VL recipients' primary concern with the material benefits of the programme on their wellbeing. Women participated largely because the value of the food was high enough to make it worth their while to do so, albeit not sufficient to affect radically their overall level of poverty or the nutritional status of their children.¹¹ The programme also had non-material wellbeing effects: helping many participants to make new friends and strengthening community identity, for example. While these are of secondary importance to recipients they nevertheless have an important bearing on how they view the programme and how it is implemented. Many members, particularly younger and often poorer women, regarded meetings as both useful and enjoyable, although others were more concerned about the demands it made on their time. The programme has adapted quite well to diverse social contexts, despite its Lima origins. And although managing CVLs imposes extra burdens of time and responsibility on leaders they do so voluntarily and can derive some benefits: an example of successful state cooption rather than just a convenient way for the state to reduce its own transaction costs.

More also needs to be said about the political evolution of the programme. With respect to gender, success in directing resources specifically to women (and in fostering autonomous social space for them) has at the same time reinforced a restricted view of women's role in society as bearers and carers of children: a limitation accentuated, for example, by exclusion of elderly women as eligible recipients (Clark and Laurie, 2000). This is then compounded by municipal authorities' use of the food as leverage to force women's participation in civic events in order to cloak their own activities in the mantle of a traditional view of motherhood.¹² While many women do regard the food as theirs by right of being citizens of Peru, this does not prevent them from also regarding it as ultimately a gift from the president in his role as chief purveyor of state patronage (Aramburu et al., 2004). This symbolic function of VL as an instrument of mass patronage is as significant

¹¹ This is consistent with other studies: for example, Stifel and Alderman (2003:32) were unable to establish a direct statistical link between programme expenditure and the nutritional status of young children, despite concluding that it was reasonably well targeted at poor and malnourished households.

¹² Some mild paternalism could be justified for overcoming free-rider constraints to organising public events which many participants enjoy and which are integral to local civic life. But it is more than mildly paternalistic to place the burden of this on mothers.

to debate over reform as details of targeting efficiency or the opportunities for petty clientelism it may offer to municipal officials and CVL leaders.

To sum up: *material* outcomes of VL are too small to have any significant long-lasting effect on overall inequality in the country. In particular, it does almost nothing to help recipients either individually or collectively to acquire assets in order to reduce long-term vulnerability or dependence on others. *Social* outcomes for some participants are important (new friends, experience of leadership) for some, but not sufficient to encourage more far-reaching public action. Meanwhile, *cultural* outcomes reinforce a significant but largely conservative sense of female, civic and national identity: the basis for weak loyalty rather than a catalyst for more radical public action. Overall, VL is part of a social settlement that reinforces the status quo: just enough material resources are involved to encourage participation, but not enough to affect overall income distribution and poverty permanently, nor to catalyse more radical public action.

How might these conclusions change as a result of expansion or reform of the programme? For a highly unequal country that has experienced reasonably rapid growth over the last decade Peru's overall expenditure on anti-poverty programmes has been described as "pathetically low."¹³ However, prospects for expansion are good: the government of President Alan Garcia is under pressure to demonstrate it can do more for poorer Peruvians and donors are keen to assist. Beyond minor tinkering, the key policy issue for the VL programme is whether it should be radically expanded or whether additional resources should be directed at alternatives, of which the leading contender is of conditional cash transfer programme. CCTs provide a cash allowance to eligible households (often women) in return for their compliance with certain conditions, such as that their children must attend clinics and primary school. Having become established on a massive scale in Brazil and Mexico, they are now being copied throughout the region, and indeed beyond (Houston, 2004; Britto, 2005; Vazquez, 2005; Molyneux, 2006; Handa & Davis, 2006). A CCT programme was first proposed for Peru by the Toledo government in 2004 under the name "*Pro-Peru*" (later renamed "*Juntos*") but only launched on a pilot basis in September 2005. Initial debate over the proposal concerned targeting methods (especially in urban areas), cash handling mechanisms (especially in rural areas with poor financial infrastructure), and the need to

¹³ Richard Webb cited in *The Economist* (2006:66). See also Vásquez (2002; 2005).

improve the quality of weak health and education services before stimulating greater demand for them (Francke, 2005).

Much of the debate over in-kind versus cash based programmes hinges on material costs, benefits and targeting efficiencies likely to result from marginal expansion of each. While beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth reporting what respondents themselves said when asked about forms of disbursement. Of the 95 women interviewed 58 opted for in-kind (the status quo), 19 said they would prefer the cash equivalent of the food, and 18 said either would be equally good. More women opted for in-kind transfer in urban areas, mostly for fear they would fritter away money on less important items. In contrast, preference for cash was strongest among richer women in rural site who pointed out they produce their own milk and cereals anyway.¹⁴

The cultural dimension of the choice between VL and a CCT can also be depicted as a choice between old paternalism (food for civic participation) and new paternalism (cash for compliance with responsible parenting). One way to compare them is to consider which creates more dangerous scope for cultivation of ambiguity (Poole, 2004): moral pressure to attend civic functions under VL, or to local government powers to force women to make their children attend schools and clinics of questionable quality. Alternatively, the moral dimension of CCTs may also be regarded more as a public relations gloss to reassure more affluent taxpayers that cash comes only with conditions.¹⁵ Meanwhile, so long as the transfer is directed impact towards mothers, then the switch to cash need not entail any weakening of the tendency for social assistance to reinforce a socially conservative view of women's prime responsibility for childcare (Molyneux, 2006).

This paper started by contrasting three contemporary views of development and proposing that the concept of wellbeing might be useful in exploring relations between them. Consistent with an *income first* view is respondents'

¹⁴ High mobility in all sites suggests cash disbursement to individuals need not necessarily be more costly than in-kind disbursement through groups, even for relatively poor women in more remote areas, but such comparisons also need to take into account non-material effects of each, particularly on skill acquisition and social interaction.

¹⁵ Britto (2005) emphasises the importance of such packaging to the success in sustaining and broadening CCTs in both Mexico (from *Progreso* to *Oportunidad*) and Brazil (from *Bolsa Escola* to *Bolsa Familia*).

emphasis on the value of the material resources transferred to them, tempered by time taken up in meetings. From a *needs first* view, the limited of funds transferred on child nutrition is striking and suggests the need either for larger transfers or for a switch to policy instruments targeted more effectively at children. From a *rights first* view the VL programme was found to be doing little to strengthen recipients' capacity for more transformative public action. By the relatively simple expedient of distinguishing between material, social and cultural dimensions, a multidimensional wellbeing perspective has accommodated a discussion of all these views. Perhaps surprisingly, social and cultural dimensions of VL were not found to be important because they exposed disconnections between state officials and intended recipients in different contexts. Rather, the analysis revealed the importance of non-material outcomes to the justification of the programme from the point of view of the state. What matters for long-term poverty reduction in Peru is not so much the extent to which the programme is prone to petty corruption at the local level, but to which it contributes to a national system of clientelism that enables government and the ruling elite to secure social stability and maintain weak loyalty at minimum budgetary cost.

More generally, the purpose of this paper has been to illustrate the important of understanding non-material as well as material effects of social assistance, notwithstanding difficulties in quantifying them. Not only in Peru are these likely to be integral to understanding how social assistance programmes ultimately defend or challenge structural inequalities underpinning persistent poverty.

REFERENCES

- Abraham, A., and Platteau, J-P. (2004) Participatory development: where culture creeps in, in: V. Rao and M. Walton (eds) *Culture and public action*. (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press), pages 210-233.
- Altamirano, T., Copestake, J.G., Figueroa, A., and Wright, K. (2004) Universal and local understanding of poverty in Peru. *Global Social Policy*, 4 (3) 313-336.
- Appadurai, A. (2004) The capacity to aspire: culture and the terms of recognition, in: V. Rao and M. Walton (eds) *Culture and public action*. (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press), pages 59-84
- Aramburu, C.E., Arias, R., Diaz, M., Alvarado, G., and Portocarrero, J.C. (2004) La vision del estado en sectores populares [Popular visions

- of the state] *Economia y Sociedad*, 53 (October), 39-46. Lima: Consorcio de Investigacion Economica y Social.
- Auyero, J. (2000) *Poor People's Politics*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Barrientos, A., and Hulme, D. (2005) Can social protection tackle chronic poverty? *European Journal of Development Research*, 17(1):1-7.
- Bebbington, A. (1999) Capitals and Capabilities: A Framework for Analyzing Peasant Viability, Rural Livelihoods and Poverty, *World Development* 27(12), 2021-2044.
- Blondet, C., and Trivelli, C. (2004) *Cucharas en alto: del asistencialismo al desarrollo local: fortaleciendo la participacion de las mujeres*. [Banging spoons: assistentialism and local development: strengthening women's participation]. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.
- Britto, T. (2005) *Recent trends in the development agenda of Latin America: an analysis of conditional cash transfers*. Unpublished paper delivered to Chronic Poverty Research Centre conference at Manchester University.
- Bustamente, M.A.S. (2003) *Characterization del programa del Vaso de Leche*. [Characteristics of the Glass of Milk programme]. Lima: Ministry of Economy and Finance.
- Clark, F.C., and Laurie, N. (2000) Gender, age and exclusion: a challenge to community organisation in Lima, Peru. *Gender and Development*, 8(2):80-88.
- Chambers, R. (1981) *Rural development: putting the last first*. London: Longman
- Chambers, R (1993) *Challenging the professions: frontiers for rural development*. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
- Chambers, R (2006) Poverty unperceived: traps, biases and agenda. Working paper 270, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton.
- Conning, J., and Kevane, M. (2002) Community-based targeting mechanisms for social safety nets: a critical review. *World Development*, 30(3):375-94.
- Copestake, J. (2006) Poverty and exclusion, resources and relationships: theorising the links between economic and social development, in: I.Gough and J.A.McGregor (eds), *Wellbeing and development: from theory to research*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Deneulin, S., Nebel, M., and Sagovsky, N. (2006) *Transforming unjust structures: the capability approach*. Dordrecht: Springer.

- Devereux, S. (2006) Looking at social protection through a livelihood lens. IDS in focus, issue 01, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton.
- DFID (2005) *Alliances against poverty: DFID's experience in Peru, 2000 to 2005*. London: Dept. for International Development
- Easterley, W. (2006) *Planners vs Searchers in foreign aid*. Asian Development Bank, distinguished speakers programme. Asian Development Bank: Manila, 18 January.
- The Economist* (2006) Peru: At the double, Ollanta the outsider. 25 March, page 56.
- Farrington, J., and Slater, R. (2006) Cash transfers: panacea for poverty reduction or money down the drain? *Development Policy Review*, 24(5):499-511.
- Figueroa, A., Altamirano, T. and Sulmont, D. (2001), *Social exclusion and inequality in Peru*. Geneva: ILO.
- Figueroa, A. (2003) *La sociedad sigma: una teoría del desarrollo económico*. [Sigma society: a theory of economic development] Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú/Fondo de Cultura Económica, Perú.
- Francke, P. (2005) Pro-Peru: un camino incierto hacia el desarrollo. [Pro-Peru: an uncertain pathway for development]. *Palestra* (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú), March-June, p.5-6.
- Gough, I. (2004) Human wellbeing and social structures: relating the universal and the local. *Global Social Policy*, 4(3):289-311.
- Gough, I. and Wood, G. (2004) *Insecurity and welfare regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Gough, I. and McGregor, J.A. (2006) *Wellbeing and development: from theory to research*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Handa, S., and Davis, B. (2006) The experience of cash transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean. *Development Policy Review*, 24(5):513:36.
- Hays-Mitchell, M (2002) Resisting austerity: a gendered perspective on neo-liberal restructuring in Peru. *Gender and Development*, 10(3):71-81.
- Hickey, S., and Bracking, S. (2005) Exploring the politics of chronic poverty: from representation to the politics of justice. *World Development*, 33(6):851-866.
- Houston, G. (2004) The danger of replication: a comparative assessment of conditional cash transfer policies in Mexico, Honduras and Nicaragua. Masters dissertation, University of Bath.

- Laderchi, C. R. (2001) Killing two birds with one stone? The effectiveness of food transfers on nutrition and monetary policy in Peru. Queen Elizabeth House, Working Paper No.74. University of Oxford: Oxford.
- Molyneux, M. (2006) Mothers at the service of the new poverty agenda: Progresa /Oportunidades, Mexico's conditional transfer programme. *Social Policy and Administration*, 40(4):425-449.
- Moser, C. O. N. (1998) The asset vulnerability framework: reassessing urban poverty reduction strategies. *World Development* 26(1), 1-19.
- Parodi, C. (2000). Perú 1960-2000: *Políticas económicas y sociales en entornos cambiantes*. [Economic and social policy in Peru, changing directions] Lima: Universidad del Pacifico.
- Platteau, J-P. and Gaspart, F. (2003) The risk of resource misappropriation in community-driven development. *World Development*, 31(10):1687-1703.
- Poole, D. (2004) Between threat and guarantee: justice and community in the margins of the Peruvian state, in: V. Das and D. Poole (eds) *Anthropology in the margins of the State*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Portocarrero, F. (2000) *Políticas Sociales en el Perú: Nuevos Aportes*. [Social policy in Peru: new contributions]. Lima: Red para el desarrollo de las Ciencias Sociales.
- Raczynski, D. (1998) The crisis of old models of social protection in Latin America: new alternatives for dealing with poverty, in: V.E. Tokman and G. O'Donnell (eds) *Poverty and inequality in Latin America: issues and new challenges* (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press), pages....
- Rao, V., and Walton, M. (2004) *Culture and public action*. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.
- Rakodi, C. (1999), 'A capital assets framework for analysing household livelihood strategies: Implications for policy', *Development policy review* 17, 315-342.
- Rousseau, S (2006) Women's citizenship and neopopulism: Peru under the Fujimori regime. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 48(1):117-41
- Schneider, A and Zuniga-Hamlin, R. (2005) Governance hybrids: pro-poor, rights based approaches in rural Peru. Working paper 240, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton.
- Stepputat, F. (2004) Marching for progress: rituals of citizenship, state & belonging in a high Andes district. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 23(2):244-59.

- Stifel, D. and Alderman, H. (2003) *The glass of milk subsidy programme and malnutrition in Peru*. World Bank Policy Research Paper 3089, Washington DC.
- Stifel, D. and Alderman, H. (2005) Targeting at the margin: the 'glass of milk' subsidy programme in Peru. *Journal of Development Studies*, 41(5):839:64.
- Tanaka, M. (2001) *Participacion popular en politicas sociales. Cuando puede ser democratica y eficiente y cuando todo lo contrario*. [Popular participation in social policy: when it can be democratic and efficient, and when precisely the opposite]. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.
- Valdivia, M. (2005) Peru: is identifying the poor the main problem in targeting nutrition programmes? HNP Discussion paper, reaching the poor program paper no.7, World Bank.
- Vazquez, E. (2005) *Subsidios para los mas pobres: seran beneficiados los ninos en extrema pobreza?* [Subsidies for the poorest: do they Benefit children in extreme poverty?] Lima: Save the Children and Universidad del Pacifico.

List of WeD Working Papers

WeD 01 'Lists and Thresholds: Comparing the Doyal-Gough Theory of Human Need with Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach' by Ian Gough (March 2003)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed01.pdf>

WeD 02 'Research on Well-Being: Some Advice from Jeremy Bentham' by David Collard (May 2003)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed02.pdf>

WeD 03 'Theorising the Links between Social and Economic Development: the *Sigma* Economy Model of Adolfo Figueroa' by James Copestake (September 2003)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed03.pdf>

WeD 04 'Discursive Repertoires and the Negotiation of Well-being: Reflections on the WeD Frameworks' by Hartley Dean (September 2003)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed04.pdf>

WeD 05 'Poverty Studies in Peru: Towards a more Inclusive Study of Exclusion' by Teofilo Altamirano, James Copestake, Adolfo Figueroa and Katie Wright (December 2003)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed05.pdf>

WeD 06 'Exploring the Structured Dynamics of Chronic Poverty: A Sociological Approach' by Philippa Bevan (May 2004)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed06.pdf>

WeD 07 'Administrative Allocation, Lease Markets and Inequality in Land in Rural Ethiopia: 1995-97' by Bereket Kebede (July 2004)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed07.pdf>

WeD 08 'Participatory Approaches and the Measurement of Well-being' by Sarah White and Jethro Pettit (August 2004)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed08.pdf>

WeD 09 'Subjective and Objective Well-Being In Relation To Economic Inputs: Puzzles and Responses' by Des Gasper (October 2004)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed09.pdf>

WeD 10 'Happiness and the Sad Topics of Anthropology' by Neil Thin (May 2005)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed10.pdf>

WeD 11 'Exploring the Quality of Life of People in North Eastern and Southern Thailand' by Darunee Jongudomkarn and Laura Camfield (August 2005)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed11.pdf>

WeD 12 'Sen and the art of quality of life maintenance: towards a working definition of quality of life' by Danny Ruta, Laura Camfield, Cam Donaldson, (January 2006)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed12.pdf>

WeD 13 'Autonomy or Dependence – or Both? Perspectives From Bangladesh.' by

Joe Devine, Laura Camfield, and Ian Gough (January 2006)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed13.pdf>

WeD 14 'Relationships, Happiness and Wellbeing: Insights from Bangladesh' by Laura Camfield, Kaneta Choudhury, and Joe Devine (March 2006)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed14.pdf>

WeD 15 'The Cultural Construction of Wellbeing: Seeking Healing in Bangladesh' by Sarah White (March 2006)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed15.pdf>

WeD 16 'Exploring the relationship between happiness, objective and subjective well-being: Evidence from rural Thailand' by Mònica Guillén Royo and Jackeline Velazco (March 2006)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed16.pdf>

WeD 17 'Measuring wealth across seven Thai communities' by Richard Clarke (April 2006)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed17.pdf>

WeD 18 'Public Goods, Global Public Goods and the Common Good' by Séverine Deneulin and Nicholas Townsend (September 2006)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed18.pdf>

WeD 19 'Theorising wellbeing in international development' by Ian Gough, J.Allister McGregor and Laura Camfield (September 2006)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed19.pdf>

WeD 20 'Researching wellbeing: From concepts to methodology' by J. Allister McGregor (September 2006)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed20.pdf>

WeD 21 'Multiple Dimensions Of Social Assistance: The Case Of Peru's 'Glass Of Milk' Programme' by J. James Copestake (September 2006)

<http://www.welldev.org.uk/research/workingpaperpdf/wed21.pdf>